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THE STABILITY PARADOX: THE TWO-PARENT
PARADIGM AND THE PERPETUATION OF
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND
CUSTODY CASES
udith ewis
Abstract
Despite changing family compositions, entrenched in family
law is the antiquated idea that a two-parent household, or its
approximation vis-à-vis a shared custody arrangement, promotes
stability and integrity and, thus, is in the best interest of the
child. Yet, the concept that the two-parent household (or shared
involvement of both parents in the child’s life if the parents separate) promotes stability for the family and is best for the child is a
dangerous fallacy. When rape or intimate partner violence (IPV)
is present, or the re-occurrence of violence remains a threat, the
family unit is far from stable.
This Article explores the legal system’s glorification of the nuclear family, its resistance to shifting away from the two-parent
paradigm, and how this resistance creates a stability paradox and
perpetuates violence against women and children. The harmful
impact that the nuclear family paradigm has on families is further explored by an examination of the statutory constructs and
judicial interpretations of termination of parental rights (TPR)
and custody statutes in cases where a child is conceived as a result
of rape or exposed to ongoing IPV.
Cases are utilized to examine how courts have interpreted
parental rights statutes where a child is conceived as a result of
rape. Additionally, a hypothetical case is discussed to explore arguments that may be advanced in TPR cases where children are
exposed to ongoing IPV. The Article finds that although there are
inherent problems in enacting statutes to terminate parental
rights in cases involving rape or IPV, legislation is also a necessary tool for survivors. Model legislation is proposed for termination of parental rights in cases where a child is conceived as a result of a sexual offense or when a child is exposed to ongoing IPV.
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Introduction
1

Entrenched within the legal system is the antiquated assumption
2
that a two-parent (often heterosexual) household promotes family stability and integrity, and thus is in the best interest of minor children.
Enacted statutes codify this concept while judges’ interpretation and application of laws reinforce it. In a recent case, for example, a mother’s
3
boyfriend was granted in loco parentis standing even though he physi4
cally and sexually abused, stalked, and financially exploited the mother.
The presiding judge highlighted the importance of having two parental
figures in the child’s life “[e]specially given the fact that the child had
already lost a father and [the mother’s boyfriend] was stepping in to that
role, which seems to me to be something very important in a young
5
child’s life to have a parental father figure.”
In the family law context, the two-parent paradigm is most often
observed in termination of parental rights (TPR) and custody cases.
Legislators have enacted statutes to terminate parental rights when the
parent is unfit or engaging in behaviors that place a child at risk of
6
harm. Parental rights and custody cases come to the attention of the
1. This Article will focus on family law.
2. The terms “nuclear family” and “two-parent family” are used interchangeably
throughout this Article.
3. A third party has standing to file an action for custody if the person stands “in loco
parentis to the child.” 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5324(2) (2018). “The term in loco
parentis literally means ‘in the place of a parent.’ A person stands in loco parentis with
respect to a child when he or she ‘assum[es] the obligations incident to the parental
relationship without going through the formality of a legal adoption.’” A.J.B. v.
A.G.B., 180 A.3d 1263, 1275 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018) (alteration in original) (citations
omitted) (quoting Peters v. Costello, 891 A.2d 705, 710 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)).
4. See Custody Complaint at ¶ 8, Hessler v. Goodrich, No. 2018-1508-CP (Susquehanna Cty. Ct. Com. Pl.); Petition to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for Custody and
Subsequent Court Order Due to Lack of Standing as to Minor Child A.G. at ¶¶ 14,
17-19, 21, Hessler v. Goodrich, No. 2018-1508-CP (Susquehanna Cty. Ct. Com.
Pl.) (detailing boyfriend’s abuse); Order, Hessler v. Goodrich, No. 2018-1508-CP
(Susquehanna Cty. Ct. Com. Pl.) (denying defendant mother’s Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Standing).
5. Transcript of Jan. 8, 2019 Custody Hearing at 66, Hessler v. Goodrich, No. 20181508-CP (Susquehanna Cty. Ct. Com. Pl.). Though this case involved separated parties, it illustrates the pervasiveness of the notion in the family court system that children’s developmental, emotional, and physical well-beings are enhanced when two
“parents” have custodial rights to the children.
6. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533 (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103
(2009); FLA. STAT. § 39.806 (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2269 (Supp. 2019); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090 (West 2014); MINN. STAT. § 260C.301 (2015); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 93-15-119 (2018); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2511 (2010).
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court in different ways. In some states, only state actors such as the Attorney General’s Office may petition for termination of parental rights
of one or both biological parents, while in other states, a biological parent or third party may petition to terminate the biological parent’s (or
7
parents’) parental rights. Grounds for terminating a parent’s rights in8
clude abuse, neglect, abandonment, and substance abuse disorders. In
order to terminate parental rights, the petitioning party must prove the
9
grounds for TPR by clear and convincing evidence. Most statutes also
require that the petitioner prove that TPR is in the best interest of the
10
child. This means that the decision to terminate parents’ rights must
provide for the child’s emotional and physical well-being and individual
11
needs. Although legislators enact TPR statutes, judges ultimately de7. For states that do not allow private litigants to file for TPR, see, e.g., ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-27-341(a)(1)(B) (2015 & Supp. 2019) (stating that termination of parental
rights is not a remedy available to “private litigants”); S.J.G. v. A.A.G., 970 So. 2d
1022, 1027 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that “there are no circumstances under
which one parent may file a petition to terminate the parental rights of another parent”); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.500 (2019) (stating that a petition to terminate parental rights may only be “filed by the state or the ward for purpose of freeing the ward
for adoption”); In re John, 605 A.2d 486, 488-89 (R.I. 1992) (holding there is no
“private right to terminate parental rights” under 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7
(2003)). For states that do, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533(A) (stating that any
person who “has a legitimate interest” in the well-being of the child may file for termination of parental rights); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 93-15-107(1)(a) (stating that “any
interested person” may file); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-2530(A) (2010) (same); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78A-6-504(1) (LexisNexis 2018) (same); In re Adoption of Liam O.,
138 A.3d 485, 488 (Me. 2016) (“Although the process is unusual, the Legislature has
given a parent the right to adopt her own child, even when her parenthood is not
questioned, so that in conjunction with that adoption proceeding, she may seek the
termination of the other parent’s parental rights.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B1103(a)(1) (2019) (stating that either parent may file when seeking termination of
the other parent’s rights); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-310(a)(i) (2019) (same). Some
states limit standing to certain circumstances. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1113 (2017 & Supp. 2020) (limiting parental standing to circumstances in which the
other parent was convicted of certain enumerated crimes whereas other persons such
as adoptive parents, extended family members caring for the child, and the child’s
guardian ad litem have standing to terminate the biological parent’s rights on more
expansive grounds such as abuse and neglect).
8. See e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103; FLA.
STAT. § 39.806; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2269; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090;
MINN. STAT. § 260C.301; MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-15-119; 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 2511.
9. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748-49 (1982).
10. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090; MINN.
STAT. § 260C.301; NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.105 (2018); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2511.
11. Focusing on the “Best Interests” of the Child, FINDLAW (Nov. 26, 2018),
https://www.findlaw.com/ (click “search legal topics,” then search “focusing on the
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cide whether a parent’s right will be terminated. Both the state and
judges, then, determine whether a parent may terminate the parental
rights of the other biological parent.
Despite these statutory efforts to protect children, judges often fail
to sever parental rights of abusive fathers because judges rely on a nuclear family paradigm, leaving mothers and children in dangerous situa12
tions. Mothers are more impacted by intimate partner violence (IPV)
13
and non-intimate partner rape because IPV and rape are gendered
crimes, affecting women more often than men; thus, these crimes have a
14
greater impact on mothers’ rights than fathers’ rights. Resistance to
shifting away from the nuclear family paradigm in IPV or non-intimate
partner rape cases stems from the compounding factors of judicial neu15
16
trality, the discounting of women’s statements of IPV and rape, and

best interests of the child”) [https://perma.cc/BR75-8W72]; see also 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 2511.
12. Intimate partner violence is when a person engages in a course of coercive and controlling behaviors such as physical and sexual violence, financial exploitation and control, psychological and emotional abuse, and the use of threats and intimidation.
Women who have been abused
have been subjected to an ongoing strategy of intimidation, isolation, and
control that extends to all areas of a woman’s life, including sexuality;
material necessities; relations with family, children, friends; and work.
Sporadic, even severe, violence makes this strategy of control effective.
But the unique profile of ‘the battered woman’ arises as much from the
deprivation of liberty implied by coercion and control as it does from
violence-induced trauma.

13.

14.
15.

16.

Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 986 (1995).
Though rape often occurs in IPV, see LUNDY BANCROFT, JAY G. SILVERMAN &
DANIEL RITCHIE, THE BATTERER AS PARENT: ADDRESSING THE IMPACT OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON FAMILY DYNAMICS 4-5 (2d ed. 2012), the terms are used
separately in this Article for purposes of analyzing how IPV and non-intimate partner
rape are addressed differently in TPR and custody statutes. The terms rape, sexual violence, and sexual offenses will be used interchangeably and, for purposes of this Article, will mean rape by a non-intimate partner. The term IPV includes sexual assault
by an intimate partner. See id. at 5.
See id. at 5.
Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: Understanding
Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
671-87 (2003) (discussing how and why the courts resist crediting domestic violence
claims in custody court).
Id. at 666-81; see Deborah Tuerkheimer, Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the
Credibility Discount, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3, 14-21 (2017) (discussing the pervasiveness of credibility discounting in the legal system’s response to rape).
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17

gender bias. All of these factors preserve (and often heighten) abusive
fathers’ parental rights. Yet, the notion that two-parent households (or
shared involvement of separated parents in the children’s lives) promote
family stability and are best for children is a dangerous fallacy. When
IPV or rape is present in intact families or re-occurrence of the violence
remains a threat when parties separate, the family unit is far from sta18
ble. Moreover, enacted legislation or judicial decisions that force a
two-parent household or shared custody arrangements perpetuate family
violence—both at an individual and systemic level—by restricting
mothers’ legal options, remedies, and fundamental rights.
The legal system’s entrenched perceptions of what is good for families is failing mothers who experience IPV and rape; limited legal protections for mothers and their children are evidence of that. Consider the
19
case of M.E. M.E. was adopted by her stepfather, who began raping
20
her at the age of four. He repeatedly raped her until she was twenty21
three years old, resulting in M.E. conceiving three children from rape.
M.E. disclosed the rapes to law enforcement when her daughter turned
four years old, fearing her stepfather would begin raping M.E.’s daugh22
ter. Her stepfather was charged with and convicted on multiple counts
23
of sexual offenses. M.E. sought to terminate the parental rights of her
stepfather to prevent him from having any parental rights to their chil24
dren. Yet, until the August 2019 Pennsylvania Superior Court decision
17. See discussion infra Part II. Although outside the scope of this Article, the nuclear
family paradigm also reinforces white dominance given that “the traditional nuclear
family is not the reality for many in the black community.” Angela Mae Kupenda,
Angelia L. M. Wallace, Jamie Deon Travis, & Brandon Isaac Dorsey, Aren’t Two
Parents Better than None: Contractual and Statutory Basics for a “New” African American Coparenting Joint Adoption Model, 9 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 59, 62
(1999). See also generally MASS. SUP. JUD. CT., GENDER BIAS STUDY OF THE COURT
SYSTEM IN MASSACHUSETTS, reprinted in 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 745, 831-48 (1990)
[hereinafter GENDER BIAS STUDY].
18. See discussion infra Part I.B.
19. In re Z.E., Nos. 3577 EDA 2018 & 3624 EDA 2018, 2019 WL 3779711 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 2019). The Barbara J. Hart Justice Center, a project of the Women’s Resource Center, and the law firm of Drinker, Biddle & Reath represented M.E.
Id. at *2. The law firm of Jenner & Block and intern Alicia G. Solow-Niederman
provided research assistance and analysis of the legal arguments for the case. Memorandum from Alicia G. Solow-Niederman to Paul M. Smith (July 26, 2016) (on file
with author). Discussions with Joan Meier, Founder of the Domestic Violence Legal
Empowerment and Appeals Project, also informed the case.
20. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *1.
21. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *2-3.
22. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *2-3.
23. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *3.
24. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *1.
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25

in In the Interest of Z.E., M.E. was unable to terminate the parental
26
rights of the man who repeatedly raped her. Prior to the 2019 decision, judicial interpretation of Pennsylvania’s TPR statute created an absurd and horrific predicament for M.E: In order to terminate the parental rights of the man who raped M.E., judges’ interpreted the statute to
mean that M.E. was required to have someone else adopt her children
27
even though she herself was repeatedly raped by an adoptive parent.
Alternatively, if M.E. did not seek termination of the parental rights of
her stepfather, she lived in fear that the man who violently raped her
28
might seek visitation and contact with their children. Under these circumstances, M.E. was psychologically and physically tethered to her
29
rapist.
This Article explores the impact that the entrenched legal notion
that two-parent households are in a child’s best interest has on families
experiencing IPV and sexual violence. It does so by examining the statutory construction and judicial interpretation of TPR and custody statutes in cases where a child is conceived as a result of rape or exposed to
ongoing IPV. Two cases will be examined to explore Pennsylvania’s
TPR statute in the contexts of rape and IPV and to demonstrate how
the analyses of these cases can have broader implications for other states.
Model legislation for TPR in cases where a child is conceived as a result
of a sexual offense or when a child is exposed to ongoing IPV will also
be proposed.
This Article will discuss both IPV and rape by a non-intimate partner. Articles often address one or the other of these types of violence
against women because there are differences between the two with, at
times, different legal analyses and outcomes within the family court sys-

25. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *1. H.B. 1984 was passed during the production of
this Article. See Table B, “Pennsylvania.”
26. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *1-2.
27. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2511 (2010).
28. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *1.
29. Shauna R. Prewitt, Note, Giving Birth to a “Rapist’s Child”: A Discussion and Analysis
of the Limited Legal Protections Afforded to Women Who Become Mothers Through
Rape, 98 GEO. L.J. 827, 830-33 (2010). “Many raped women who are forced to share
custody and visitation privileges with their rapists may never overcome their rapes. By
being tethered to their rapists, they are continually forced ‘to experience over and
over the victimization that occurred at the time of the rape.’” Id. at 832-33. Prewitt
provides a description of prototypes for rape victims and how these prototypes impact
legislation. Id. at 836-40, 848-54. She also provides a comparative analysis of two
types of laws that exist for women whose children are conceived as a result of rape. Id.
at 853-60. These laws are for women who elect to place their children up for adoption and women who choose to raise their children. Id.
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tem. In most non-intimate partner rape cases, the only connection between the child and the person who committed the rape is purely biological. In these cases, the male committing the rape is nothing more
30
than a “violent sperm donor.” Conversely, in cases of IPV, there is
usually an established relationship between the child and the parent who
is engaging in abusive and controlling behaviors beyond the biological
relationship. As discussed in Parts III and IV, enacted laws, absence of
laws, and legal analysis in custody and TPR cases may differ between
IPV and non-intimate partner rape cases based on the biological parent’s relationship with the child.
Even though these differences exist, there are advantages to addressing both here because together they provide a richer contextual
view of TPR and custody laws. Overall, whether a custody or TPR case
involves IPV or non-intimate partner rape, that case is being litigated
within the broader legal context. This context glorifies the two-parent
paradigm, discounts allegations of rape and IPV, and dismisses the effects of sexual violence and IPV on a mother’s parenting ability and on
children. As such, a comparison as to how the legal system treats IPV
and non-intimate partner rape not only explains the existence or absence
of TPR and custody laws but also the resistance to paradigm shifts that
threaten the two-parent model and fathers’ rights.
Part I begins with an examination of the legal system’s glorification
of the nuclear family. Although the legal system and society have begun
31
to acknowledge changing family demographics, there is resistance to
enacting laws and issuing judicial decisions that undermine a two-parent
household paradigm. Even when parents separate, the legal system seeks
to approximate the nuclear family through shared custody arrange32
ments. Part I also documents the “stability paradox.” Laws and judicial
decisions espouse “permanency” and “stability” as the main reasons for
33
privileging the nuclear family or its close approximation. In cases
where IPV and rape are present, however, there is little stability or permanency for minor children under this paradigm.

30. Wendy Murphy, Impregnation Rapists, Parental Rights, and the Often Ignored Constitutional Rights of Victims: An Important Case Study from Massachusetts, 15 J. CHILD
CUSTODY 169, 181-82 (2019).
31. See discussion infra Part I.
32. In this Article, “shared custody arrangement” means an arrangement where the
mother and the father are awarded equal or close to equal parenting time with the
minor children.
33. See Rutledge v. Rutledge, 487 So. 2d 218, 219 (Miss. 1986) (citing David Miller,
Joint Custody, 13 FAM. L.Q. 345, 360 (1979)).

2020]

THE STABILITY PARADOX

319

Part II explores why the nuclear family paradigm persists in cases
involving IPV and rape. The main factors permitting the glorification of
the two-parent family to continue are the judicially created notion of
34
35
parental equality, the discounting of women’s allegations of rape and
36
37
IPV, and gender bias within the legal system. Tragically, in cases involving IPV and rape, the factors that reinforce this paradigm do so at
the cost of perpetuating violence against women and children.
Part III illustrates how the nuclear family paradigm and the factors
reinforcing it have resulted in laws that afford mothers limited ability to
deny the parentage of the person who raped them or terminate the parental rights of biological fathers who expose children to ongoing IPV.
This section also explores the limited rights of mothers to prevent their
rapist from having custodial visitation with the child who was conceived
as a result of the sexual offense.
Part IV situates the nuclear family paradigm and the factors reinforcing it within the context of several cases challenging the constitutionality of TPR statutes that permit terminating the parental rights of a
person who committed rape when the child is conceived as a result of
the sexual assault. One of the cases, In the Interest of Z.E., challenged the
38
constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s Adoption Act. Arguments made in
that case, the Superior Court’s decision on appeal, and arguments
brought forth in other state cases are discussed to provide a broader con39
textual analysis beyond Pennsylvania law. The case of M.P. v. M.P. is
then used to explore arguments that may be advanced to terminate a
parent’s rights in cases where children are exposed to ongoing IPV.
Part V discusses the disadvantages and advantages of enacting TPR
statutes specifically to address cases where a child is conceived as a result
of a sexual offense or a child is exposed to ongoing IPV. Part V argues
that statutes should be enacted or amended despite the disadvantages to
states having TPR statutes. Part V also proposes model TPR legislation
based on existing state laws, prior articles on the topic, and practical experience.

34. Meier, supra note 15, at 666-81 (discussing how and why the courts resist crediting
domestic violence claims in custody court).
35. Tuerkheimer, supra note 16, at 3, 14-21 (discussing the pervasiveness of credibility
discounting in the legal system’s response to rape).
36. Meier, supra note 15, at 681-86.
37. GENDER BIAS STUDY, supra note 17, at 833.
38. 23 PA. CONST. STAT. § 2101 (2020).
39. M.P. v. M.P., 54 A.3d 950 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). Although this was not a TPR case,
the case facts are discussed in Part IV to illustrate arguments that could be made to
terminate a parent’s rights in cases where a child is exposed to IPV.
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I. The Legal System’s Glorification of the
Two-Parent Household
The legal response to IPV and rape within families has been shaped
by the entrenched rhetoric that children fare better when both parents
are involved in their lives and that both parents will act in their best interest. This presupposition results in statutes, or an absence of them,
and judicial decisions that either glorify nuclear “intact” family struc40
tures or, if the parents have separated, extol co-parenting and shared
custody arrangements.
The legal system’s two-parent paradigm, however, is problematic in
family law for two reasons. First, it is not reflective of modern family
compositions in the United States. In 1960, the two-parent household
was the dominant family form with 73% of all children living in nuclear
41
families. By 1980, a societal shift away from the nuclear family was
emerging with the number of children living with two married parents
42
in their first marriage decreasing to 61%. By 2015, this number had
43
decreased significantly to a mere 46% of children. Additionally, the
societal shift away from the two-parent household resulted in a substan44
tial increase in the percentage of woman-headed households. In 2018,
31% of families in the United States were one-parent families, with
45
77% being woman-headed households. In 2016, 23% of children
lived with only their mothers, almost triple the 8% that lived with only
46
their mother in 1960. Thus, a significant number of households, par40. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Our Scared Institution: The Ideal of Family in
American Law and Society, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 387, 388-89 (“People live in a wide
diversity of intimate arrangements . . . but they do so at risk. Historically only the
nuclear family has been protected and promoted by legal and cultural institutions.”).
41. Parenting in America, PEW RESCH. CTR. (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.pew
socialtrends.org/2015/12/17/1-the-american-family-today/ [https://perma.cc/69QCUSPW]. This statistic reflects children living in families with two married parents in
their first marriage.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. HISTORICAL FAMILIES TABLES, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Table FM-1 (Nov. 2019),
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/families/families.html
[https://perma.cc/MZ44-AR8X]. According to Table FM-1, in 2018, there were a
total of 34,452,000 families with children (biological, step, or adopted) under 18 living in the United States. Of this number, 23,812,000 were married couples,
8,156,000 were mother-only, and 2,484,000 were father-only. Id.
46. The Majority of Children Live with Two Parents, Census Bureau Reports, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2016
/cb16-192.html [https://perma.cc/PLK7-74CA].
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ticularly woman-headed households, do not “fit” the two-parent paradigm. Despite woman-headed families not fitting into the nuclear family paradigm, the family court system attempts to recreate the two-parent
household by favoring parents who co-parent and ordering shared cus47
tody arrangements. Many woman-headed one-parent households, particularly low-income households, however, have experienced IPV or
48
rape by the child’s father. The approximation of the nuclear family,
then, increases the risk of ongoing violence to mothers and their children.
Second, the glorification of the nuclear family or its approximation
via a shared custody arrangement perpetuates violence against women
and children, placing them at risk of harm. Most cases litigated in the
49
family court system involve IPV or sexual violence. As discussed in
Part II, however, the legal system discounts women’s accounts of violence. By discounting the violence, the legal system continues to adhere
to the two-parent paradigm even when this creates a “stability paradox”:
a situation where the legal system upholds the nuclear family or its approximation on the grounds that it provides more permanency and stability for children when, in fact, the paradigm creates more instability in
family units where violence has occurred. Before Part B further discusses
the stability paradox and the perpetuation of violence against women
and children, Part A will explore the glorification of the nuclear family
in enacted statutes and judicial opinions. Part A will show how pervasive
the glorification of the two-parent household is throughout family law,
with the discussion not limited to cases involving IPV and rape.
A. Legislative and Judicial Language Reinforcing the Nuclear Family
The legal system has largely resisted shifting away from framing
statutes and issuing judicial decisions based on a nuclear family paradigm. This is the case despite the “ever-changing landscape of the family

47. Angela Marie Caulley, Equal Isn’t Always Equitable: Reforming the Use of Joint Custody
Presumptions in Judicial Child Custody Determinations, 27 B.U. PUB. INST. L.J. 403,
427 (2018).
48. Núria Vergés Bosch, Anna Morero Beltran, Joaquina Erviti Erice, & Elisabet Almeda
Samaranch, Intimate Partner Violence in Female-Headed One-Parent Households: Generating Data on Prevalence, Consequences, and Support, 72 WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L F.
95, 97-98 (2019).
49. See BANCROFT ET AL., supra note 13, at 3 (noting that fathers who are abusive “are
more likely than nonbattering men to seek custody of their children in cases of divorce or separation”).
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50

unit” and the harm this paradigm can cause to children in cases involving sexual assault or IPV. Pennsylvania’s Adoption Act and how the
courts have interpreted it are illustrative of the extent to which the twoparent paradigm permeates the law. Pursuant to the Act, either parent of
a minor child has standing to file a petition for involuntary termination
51
of the parental rights of the other parent. One of the enumerated
grounds for termination is when “the parent is the father of a child con52
ceived as a result of rape or incest.”
At first glance, the Act appears to provide M.E. and other rape survivors with the ability to terminate the parental rights of the biological
53
parent to her children. Prior to the 2019 decision in In the Interest of
Z.E., however, trial courts had limited the ability of mothers to petition
for TPR. Courts had held that a parent could only petition to terminate
the parental rights of the other parent when there was an averment of
54
55
adoption and a new parent-child relationship was being established.
In In re Adoption of M.R.D., for example, the father whose TPR was
sought failed to perform parental duties, including providing financial
56
support for the minor child, for approximately seven years. The maternal grandfather had played a significant role in the child’s life co-

50. In re Z.E., Nos. 3577 EDA 2018 & 3624 EDA 2018, 2019 WL 3779711, at *8 n.26
(Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 2019).
51. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2512(a) (2010). A petition to terminate parental rights may
also be filed by an agency, an individual having custody or in loco parentis standing,
or an attorney or guardian ad litem representing a child who has been adjudicated
dependent. Id.
52. Id. § 2511(a)(7).
53. Pennsylvania has often been erroneously cited as a state that affords expansive protections for survivors of rape. In fact, until the decision in In re Z.E., mothers had been
denied the ability to terminate the parental rights of fathers at the trial court level if a
contemplated adoption was not averred. In one Pennsylvania county, the clerk’s office would not even permit a litigant to file a Petition to Involuntarily Terminate the
Parental Rights because it did not contain a contemplated adoption averment. These
assertions are based on conversations with family law attorneys practicing in Pennsylvania.
54. The legal term “averment” means a positive statement of fact, particularly in a pleading. Averment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). In Pennsylvania, then, a
Petition to Involuntarily Terminate the Parental Rights must contain a statement
that another person intends to adopt the minor child when a parent seeks to terminate the parental rights of the other biological parent. In re Adoption of M.R.D., 145
A.3d 1117, 1120 (Pa. 2016).
55. Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1120 (“Thus, where ‘no new parent-child relationship is contemplated . . . the involuntary termination of . . . parental rights . . . is not
permitted under the Adoption Act.’” (quoting In re Male Infant B.E., 377 A.2d 153,
156 (Pa. 1977))).
56. Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1118.
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parenting with the mother, disciplining the child, attending functions,
57
and providing financial support. Though the mother’s petition to terminate contained an averment that the maternal grandfather would
adopt the child, the Superior Court held that her petition failed because
the mother and the maternal grandfather were not “part of an intact
58
family unit.” Thus, even in cases where a third party is willing to adopt
the child and create the approximation of a nuclear family, the court
still considers the structure unacceptable when an “intact family” is feasible vis-à-vis a custody arrangement between the natural parents. The
court holds this view even when a shared custody arrangement between
the natural parents is the less stable arrangement for the child.
The reasoning in In re Adoption of M.R.D. demonstrates how ingrained the belief is that a two-parent household best serves a child’s
well-being. Noting that the Act requires a parent seeking termination to
relinquish their own parental rights, the court analyzed two exceptions
59
to this requirement. First, a parent need not relinquish their own parental rights when filing to terminate the rights of the other parent in
second-parent adoption cases—cases where the adopting party is the
60
spouse of the party seeking termination. Second, a court may determine
that a parent need not relinquish their own parental rights when seeking
to terminate the rights of the other parent if the court determines that it
61
is “unnecessary under the particular circumstances of [their case].” The
court found that neither of these requirements was met in In re Adoption
of M.R.D. because the purpose of the Act, which was to “protect the in62
tegrity and stability of the new family unit,” would not be served by
the maternal grandfather adopting the child. Notice how the court differentiates second-parent adoption cases from the facts of In re Adoption
of M.R.D., further reinforcing the nuclear family paradigm:
[I]n second-parent adoption cases in which the relinquishment of the parent’s right’s is not required—i.e. stepparent
57.
58.
59.
60.

Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1118-19.
Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1128.
Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1120-21.
Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1121 (noting that “whenever a parent consents to
the adoption of his child by his spouse, the parent-child relationship between him
and his child shall remain whether or not he is one of the petitioners in the adoption
proceeding” (quoting 23 PA. CONS. STAT § 2903 (2010))).
61. Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1127-28; see also 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2901 (2010)
(“Unless the court for cause shown determines otherwise, no decree of adoption shall
be entered unless the natural parent or parents’ rights have been terminated . . . and
all other legal requirements have been met.”).
62. Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1128.

324

michigan journal of gender

& law

[Vol. 27:311

adoptions and adoptions by same-sex couples—
relinquishment of the parent’s rights is unnecessary, and indeed damaging. In such cases, the parent and the prospective
adoptive parent are committed partners . . . . Adoption in
such circumstances allows the prospective adoptive parent to
create a new parent-child relationship with the legal parent’s
child and a family unit together with the co-parent to whom
he or she is committed. Thus, because the legal parent and
prospective parent in second-parent adoption cases are part of
the same family unit, the relinquishment requirement undermines, rather than promotes family stability. The same
cannot be said for the instant case, however, because Mother
and Grandfather are not similarly part of an intact family
63
unit.
Justice Bear’s concurring opinion not only blatantly states what the
majority signals but also overtly glorifies two-parent households: “We
should acknowledge and applaud the wise public policy adopted by our
legislature in the Adoption Act: the ideal family for children is two parents together in an intact marriage. This may be a traditional notion,
64
but it is rooted in the belief that children benefit from permanency.”
Justice Bear further contends that “even in this modern age where
non-traditional families may exist, marriage is the best legal proxy of permanency for children” and “the law is loath to leave children with only one
parent, as children derive no benefit from having a parent’s rights terminated, unless a new, committed parent is ready, willing and able to take
65
that terminated parent’s place.”
Cases pre- and post-In re Adoption of M.R.D. also illustrate the ex66
tent to which the legal system upholds the nuclear family paradigm. In
In re Adoption of J.D.S., for instance, the court denied the mother’s petition to terminate the father’s parental rights when the mother and the
stepfather, the contemplated adoptive parent, separated and were con67
sidering divorce during the pendency of the appeal. Notice again how
the court glorifies the intact two-parent household: “Because the primary function of government and law is to preserve and perpetuate society,
63.
64.
65.
66.

Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1128.
Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1131 (Bear, J., concurring).
Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1132 (Bear, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., In re E.M.I., 57 A.3d 1278 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018); In re C.F.G., 194 A.3d
718 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018) (unpublished table decision); In re I.S.R., 169 A.3d 1181
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2017).
67. In re Adoption of J.D.S., 763 A.2d 867, 871-72 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
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the traditional family structure is given every reasonable presumption in
its favor. This comprehends an intact and subsisting family including a
68
stepparent.” Even with an averred adoption by the stepfather, the
mother’s petition failed because her potential divorce from him did not
create an intact enough family to overcome the two-parent paradigm.
Judicial decisions relying on language and reasoning that favor the
two-parent paradigm are present in other jurisdictions as well. Some examples include: “[T]he child’s best interest will be better served by being
exposed to a more traditional family environment composed of two par69
ents;” awarding custody to the foster family, in part, because they were
70
a “more traditional family;” awarding primary custody to mother because, although, “[e]ach parent offers a permanent family unit for the
71
child[, t]he mother offers the more traditional family unit;” and
awarding primary custody to the father because “the child would be in a
72
stable, traditional, family setting.” In all of these cases, the “traditional
family” was a two-parent household because one of the child’s biological
parents had remarried, was engaged to be married, or the prospective
foster parents were married.
Even when judicial opinions recognize the changing demographics
in family compositions, concurring or dissenting opinions often contain
language to counter this recognition. Illustrative of this phenomenon is
73
the case Clark v. Wade. In Clark v. Wade, the maternal grandmother, a
third party, sought custody of her grandchild over the child’s biological
74
father’s objection. Pursuant to Georgia law, there is a presumption
that it is in the best interest of the child to remain in the custody of his

68. Adoption of J.D.S., 763 A.2d at 871; see also In re Adoption of K.M.W., 718 A.2d
332, 334 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (noting that when a parent retains her rights, “the
other party must be the spouse of the parent retaining custodial rights”).
69. Pounders v. Rouse, 582 So.2d 672, 676 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
70. Edwards v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 480 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Ark. Ct. App. 2016).
71. Hanisch v. Osvold, 758 N.W.2d 421, 425 (N.D. 2008) (noting that mother was engaged to be married).
72. S.B. v. L.W, 793 So. 2d 656, 658 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming lower court decision awarding custody to father because he was married to his wife and thus had a
stable environment). This decision also highlights how the legal system favors heterosexual family units. The mother was bisexual and the court specifically noted that it
was disturbed by “mother’s bisexual lifestyle” and that the “morality of” a parent’s
lifestyle was one factor the court could consider. Id. at 661.
73. Clark v. Wade, 544 S.E.2d 99 (Ga. 2001).
74. Clark, 544 S.E.2d at 101. The minor child had resided with the maternal grandparents since his birth in 1994 with father exercising regular visitation rights. Id. In
1999, father sought custody of his son. Id. The trial court awarded father temporary
custody. Id.
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75

or her parents. To overcome this presumption, the Clark court—
showing extreme deference to biological parents—determined that a
third party (in this case, the grandparent) must demonstrate that there
would be physical or emotional harm to the child if the child’s parents
76
were awarded custody (the harm standard). If a third party overcomes
this presumption, “the third party must show that an award of custody
to him or her will best promote the child’s health, welfare, and happi77
ness” (the best interest of the child standard).
In a special concurring opinion, Justice Hunstein acknowledged
that, in modern society, it is no longer a reality that all biological par78
ents raise children in nuclear families. She, therefore, asserted that less
deference should be afforded to the natural parents in family law cases
79
when a third party seeks custody of the minor child. In response, Justice Sears lamented the decline of the traditional family and sought to
stem its erosion:
I take issue with the assertion in Justice Hunstein’s special
concurrence that the changing face of the American family
justifies the application of a best-interest-of-the-child standard when a third party seeks to obtain custody of a parent’s
child. To the contrary, I find that the lamentable decline in
the traditional family supports the harm standard adopted in
the majority opinion . . . . [T]he harm standard would stem

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Clark, 544 S.E.2d at 101
Clark, 544 S.E.2d at 107.
Clark, 544 S.E.2d at 107.
Clark, 544 S.E.2d at 110 (Hunstein, J., concurring).
See Clark, 544 S.E.2d at 110-12 (Hunstein, J., concurring).
Parental autonomy is grounded in the assumption that natural parents
raise their own children in nuclear families, consisting of a married couple and their children . . . . The realities of modern living, however,
demonstrate that the validity of according almost absolute judicial deference to parental rights has become less compelling as the foundation upon which they are premised, the traditional nuclear family, has eroded . . . . More varied and complicated family situations arise as divorces,
and decisions not to marry, result in single-parent families; as remarriages
create step-families; as some parents abandon their children; as others
give them to temporary caretakers; and as still others are judged unfit to
raise their own children.
Id. (Hunstein, J., concurring) (some omissions in original) (quoting Brooks v.
Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 778-79 (Ga. 1995) (Benham, J., dissenting)).
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the decline of the nuclear family by fostering the reunifica80
tion of parent and child.
Enacted statutes also reinforce the concept of the nuclear family.
Utah provides one such example. Utah’s statutes contain preambles that
declare that it is the public policy of the legislature to preserve the family
81
unit. Utah also has a strong preference for placing a child for adoption
82
with a “married couple.”
This glorification of the idea that a two-parent household best provides stability and permanence for children also impacts laws and judicial decisions regarding parties who separate or divorce. Post-separation
parents are expected to co-parent and promote frequent and continuing
83
contact with the other parent. In addition, decisions awarding shared

80. Clark, 544 S.E.2d at 109 (Sears, J., concurring).
81. E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-11.1 (LexisNexis 2019) (“It is the public policy of the
state of Utah to strengthen the family life foundation of our society . . . and to take
reasonable measures to preserve marriages, particularly where minor children are involved.”); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.020 (2020) (“The legislature declares
that the family unit is a fundamental resource of American life which should be nurtured. Toward the continuance of this principle, the legislature declares that the family unit should remain intact . . . .”).
82. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117(4) (2018 & Supp. 2020).
83. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.090(6)(E) (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403
(A)(6) (2017); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(VI) (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 23-3203(a)(8) (Supp. 2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.23(j) (2019); MINN.
STAT. § 518.17(a)(11) (2019); MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375.2(2)(4) (2016); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 125C.0035(4)(c) (2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461-A:6(I)(e)
(2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(B)(8) (2020); N.D. CENT. CODE. § 14-0906.2(1)(e) (2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137(1)(f) (2019); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 5238(a)(1) (2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10(2)(c)(ii) (LexisNexis 2019); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665(b)(5) (2019); WIS. STAT. § 767.41(5)(11) (2017-18).
Though many of these statutes provide an exception for when there is a history of
past or present IPV, mothers may not be able to sufficiently prove the IPV or judges
may discount the IPV and then condemn the mother when she does not promote
frequent contact with the father who has been abusive and controlling. See Meier, supra note 15, at 678-79; Leigh Goodmark, From Property to Personhood: What the Legal System Should Do for Children in Family Violence Cases, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 237,
257 n.142 (noting that a mother’s “legitimate concern[s] about the batterer’s ability
to parent can be used as a justification for denying her custody” when she cannot
prove the IPV). Judges not only frequently inform litigants that they need to coparent but also issue orders that attempt to enforce co-parenting. In one county in
Pennsylvania, for example, I have observed a judge routinely tell parents during any
proceeding that involves custody that they must learn to co-parent even when there is
a history of IPV and rape and when there is an active protection order in place. This
same judge frequently issues custody court orders that contain language that the custodial/visitation times will be by agreement of the parties. In cases involving IPV, this
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legal and physical custody continue to be the norm because it “approx84
imates . . . an intact nuclear family.”
Statutes and judicial opinions highlight how pervasive the glorification of the traditional family is in the legal system. Part B will address
how this is problematic in many family cases because it fails to address
IPV and rape to the detriment of mothers and children. Part B will also
show how the nuclear family paradigm counter productively creates the
stability paradox.
B. The Stability Paradox
Though the purported intent of the nuclear family paradigm is to
85
provide stability and permanency for children, it does the exact oppovague language results in more opportunities for the controlling party continue their
abuse.
84. Rutledge v. Rutledge, 487 So. 2d 218, 219 (Miss. 1986). Shared custody orders continue to be the norm despite an abundance of research demonstrating that exposure
to IPV negatively affects children and that post-separation contact results in on-going
abuse. See Meier, supra note 15, at 678-80. In fact, a number of states have codified
shared custody presumptions. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-56a(b) (2019) (stating a presumption that joint custody is in best interest of child when parents have
agreed to it); IDAHO CODE § 32-717B(4) (2019) (stating that “absent preponderance
of evidence to the contrary,” there is a presumption that joint custody is in best interest of the child); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(2) (West 2018) (stating a presumption, rebuttable by preponderance of evidence, that joint custody and equally shared
parenting time is in best interest of child); MINN. STAT. § 518.17(b)(9) (2019) (stating a rebuttable presumption that joint custody is in best interest of child when one
or both parties request it); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(4) (2018) (stating a presumption that joint custody is in best interest of child when parents have agreed to
it); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461-A:5 (2018) (presuming that joint decision making
is in the best interest of the child); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(A) (2020) (stating a
presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of the child); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(A)(i) (2017 & Supp. 2020) (stating a presumption that joint
custody is in best interest of child when parents have agreed to it); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 153.131(b) (West 2014) (stating a rebuttable presumption that parents acting
as joint managing conservators is in the best interest of the child); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-3-10(3) (LexisNexis 2019) (stating a rebuttable presumption that joint legal
custody is in best interest of child); WIS. STAT. § 767.41(2)(am) (2009) (stating a
presumption that joint legal custody is in best interest of child). Though many of
these statutes provide an exception to the presumption when there is a history of past
or present IPV, the abuse is often dismissed or discredited resulting in shared custody
arrangements. See infra Part I.B.
85. The legal system’s glorification of the two-parent household, which is a proxy for fathers’ involvement in children’s lives, results from concepts of parental equality, societal discounting of mothers’ accounts of IPV and rape and gender bias. See discussion
infra Part II.
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site in cases involving IPV or rape. Violence against women and chil86
dren’s exposure to this violence is a global epidemic. The 2015 National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey conducted by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention found that one in five
87
women experienced completed or attempted rape during her lifetime.
It is estimated that there are between 25,000 and 32,000 rape-related
88
pregnancies annually in the United States. Though it is difficult to determine the number of children conceived from rape, one study found
that approximately 32% of women who have been raped kept their
89
children. Another study found that 64% of women raised their chil90
dren conceived from rape.
When children are conceived as a result of a sexual offense, they are
91
often harmed because the rape affects a mother’s ability to parent.
Forced interaction between a mother and the person who raped her is
92
likely to impede her recovery process. “Most raped women suffer from
symptoms of one of the various forms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and nearly one-third of all raped women develop rape93
related post-traumatic stress disorder (RR-PTSD).” In order to recover, women who experience PTSD “must alleviate stress, which may ‘involve avoid[ing] any thoughts, feelings, or cues which could bring up
94
the catastrophic and most traumatizing elements of the rape.’” Women
86. The 2012 National Task Force on Children Exposed to Violence found that “of the
76 million children currently residing in the United States, an estimated 46 million
can expect to have their lives touched by violence, crime, abuse, and psychological
trauma this year.” REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S NATIONAL TASK FORCE
ON CHILDREN EXPOSED TO VIOLENCE 3 (2012), https://www.justice.gov
/defendingchildhood/cev-rpt-full.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9A8-NVCS]. Exposure to
domestic violence was one of the forms of violence highlighted in the report. See, e.g.,
id. at 32.
87. SHARON G. SMITH, XINJIAN ZHANG, KATHLEEN C. BASILE, MELISSA T. MERRICK,
JING WANG, MARCIE-JO KRESNOW, & JIERU CHEN, NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER
AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2015 DATA BRIEF 1 (2018), https://www.cdc.gov
/violenceprevention/pdf/2015data-brief508.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4AL-RPYH].
88. Rape Survivor Child Custody Act, H.R. 1257, 114th Cong. § 2(2) (2015); see also
Prewitt, supra note 29, at 828 (“[B]ased on a 1990 study estimating that 683,000
women over the age of eighteen were raped in that year, conceivably 32,000 raperelated pregnancies occur annually.”).
89. H.R. 1257, supra note 88, §2(4); see also Prewitt, supra note 29, at 829 (“One study
found that 50% of women who became pregnant by rape underwent abortions, 5.9%
placed their infants for adoptions, and 32.3% of raped women kept their infants.”).
90. H.R. 1257, supra note 88, § 2(5).
91. Id. § 2(11).
92. Id. § 2(10).
93. Prewitt, supra note 29, at 833-34.
94. Id. at 834.
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who are continuously forced into contact with their rapist in custody
matters, however, cannot escape the triggers of their trauma:
[W]omen who choose to raise their rape-conceived children,
then, may be put in a Catch-22 if their rapists assert custody
and visitation privileges. To effectively parent their children,
these raped women must adequately overcome their victimization; however, in order to do that, these women must be
able to escape from the “triggers” that make healing from
their victimization impossible. Unfortunately, escaping from
these triggers may range from difficult to impossible because,
through the exercise of parental rights, most rapists are able
to interact frequently with their rape-conceived children and,
95
as a result, their victims.
IPV is just as prevalent as sexual violence against women. One in
four women in the United States has “experienced contact sexual violence, physical violence, and/or stalking by an intimate partner and re96
ported an IPV-related impact during their lifetime.” Studies estimate
97
that over three million children are exposed to IPV each year. Examples of how children are exposed to IPV include directly observing vio-

95. Id. at 834-35. Indirect contact with the rapist, such as the rapist giving the child gifts
that are brought back to the mother’s house or telephone contact with the child in
which the mother overhears the rapist, can also be triggers for the victim. See id. at
832; see also H.R. 1257, supra note 88, § 2(12). (“Rapists may use the threat of pursuing custody or parental rights to coerce survivors into not prosecuting rape, or otherwise harass, intimidate, or manipulate them.”) In many cases, however, the person
who committed the rape often does not even want custody of the child but will exercise custody or visitation privileges to exert control over the victim, resulting “‘in the
child . . . becoming a pawn in the predator’s power game.’” Prewitt, supra, at 835.
96. SMITH ET AL., supra note 87, at 7. “Contact sexual violence” is defined as “a combined measure that includes rape, being made to penetrate someone else, sexual coercion, and/or unwanted sexual contact.” Id. “Intimate partner violence-related impact
includes experiencing any of the following: being fearful, concerned for safety, injury,
need for medical care, needed help from law enforcement, missed at least one day of
work, missed at least one day of school.” Id. Note that IPV is the leading cause of injury for women, even more common than car accidents, muggings, and rapes combined and that an estimated 41 percent of murdered women are killed by their intimate partner. Nancy Ver Steegh, The Silent Victims: Children and Domestic Violence,
26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 775, 778, 779 (2000).
97. Amy Haddix, Unseen Victims: Acknowledging the Effects of Domestic Violence Through
Statutory Termination of Parental Rights, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 757, 760 (1996). Haddix
argues that evidence of a parent committing IPV in the presence of minor children
should be admissible in TPR proceedings to demonstrate the parent’s unfitness. See
id.
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lence; hearing their mother screaming for help or crying; observing the
aftermath of the violence such as their mother’s injuries, torn clothing,
or broken or damaged items; or hearing their father degrade, belittle, or
98
threaten their mother. Exposure to IPV can continue post-separation
99
as children are used as pawns in the abusive parent’s fight for control.
Survivors of IPV also experience PTSD. Again, PTSD has a direct
impact on children because mothers’ ability to effectively parent is hindered by repeated and forced contact with fathers who have been (and
100
often continue to be) abusive and controlling. Unlike in cases where a
mother is raped by a non-intimate partner, however, IPV has additional
negative and harmful effects on children because the abusive partner is
101
part of the family unit prior to the parties separating. Post-separation,
children’s exposure to IPV continues because fathers frequently disparage the mother in the presence of the minor children, physically and
mentally abuse her in front of the minor children, interrogate the children about their mother, use the children to investigate and stalk her,
102
and generally use the children as pawns. Thus, in cases involving IPV,
98. Ver Steegh, supra note 96, at 784; see also Leslie D. Johnson, Comment, Caught in
the Crossfire: Examining Legislative and Judicial Response to the Forgotten Victims of
Domestic Violence, 22 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 271, 273-74 (1998) (noting that many
children hear or see the physical abuse and observe the aftermath of the physically
abuse such as bruising and broken bones).
99. For example, one commentator has observed that “survivors are at increased risk for
physical violence when they take steps to leave abusers” and that “the risk of violence,
including sexual assault, is highest immediately following separation and when victims attempt permanent separation through legal or other action.” Deborah Goelman
& Darren Mitchell, Protecting Victims of Domestic Violence Under the UCCJEA, 61
JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 1, 2-3 (2010). Goelman and Mitchell further note:
In addition to the risks of separation violence, perpetrators often pursue
protracted custody or visitation litigation as a means of controlling their
former partners. Batterers may manipulate custody proceedings to obtain
information about their former victims, to continue monitoring them, or
to create opportunities for contact in order to perpetrate additional violence. Many batterers repeatedly file for modification of custody orders to
harass or punish victims for leaving.
Id. at 3.
100. Peter G. Jaffe & Claire V. Crooks, Understanding Women’s Experiences Parenting in
the Context of Domestic Violence: Implications for Community and Court-Related Services Providers, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ONLINE RESOURCES (Feb. 2005),
http://safeandtogetherinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/parentingindv11.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7GV-VE5K].
101. See generally BANCROFT ET AL., supra note 13, at 33-107 (describing typical parenting
characteristics of parents who engage in IPV and how these parenting characteristics
affect the family unit).
102. See id. at 136.
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children are continuously exposed to violence resulting in various short103
and long-term harms to them. Children exposed to IPV often develop
PTSD resulting in “above-average risk for self-destructive behavior, such
104
as suicide, alcohol and drug abuse, and sexual promiscuity.” They also
have higher levels of learning difficulties, anxiety, hyperactivity, and be105
havior problems. Moreover, children exposed to IPV are “twice as
likely to have juvenile court involvement and three times as likely to be
106
in juvenile court for a violent offense.” Further, approximately half of
children living in households where their mothers experience ongoing
107
abuse by their father are also physically assaulted by their fathers.
The effects are ongoing: “Negative emotional effects from exposure
to domestic violence can persist into adulthood, leading to higher rates
of emotional distress and lower rates of successful social connec108
tion . . . and to higher rates of depressive symptoms.” Female children
exposed to IPV are more likely to become victims of violence; male
children exposed to IPV are more likely to become violent towards a
109
partner. Studies have also found that exposure to intimate partner vio110
lence results in alterations in children’s brain structures.

103. See generally id. at 42-54 (providing an overview how exposure to IPV effects children).
104. Johnson, supra note 98, at 274-75. “Children from violent homes are more likely to
run away, use drugs and alcohol, attempt suicide, and exhibit assaultive behavior.”
Ver Steegh, supra note 96, at 786.
105. BANCROFT ET AL., supra note 13, at 44. Children exposed to IPV are more frequently
absent from school and more often suspended from school for behavioral problems.
Id.
106. Id. at 45.
107. Ver Steegh, supra note 96, at 779.
108. BANCROFT ET AL., supra note 13, at 45.
109. Johnson, supra note 98, at 275.
110. See, e.g., Areti Tsavoussis, Stanislaw P.A. Stawicki, Nicoleta Stoicea & Thomas J. Papadimos, Child-Witnessed Domestic Violence and Adverse Effects on Brain Development:
A Call for Societal Self-Examination and Awareness, 2 FRONTIERS PUB. HEALTH 1, 4
(2014).
The impact on the community at large is of importance and concern; the
effects on child witnesses of DV extend beyond the families and children.
These children have impaired learning skills, poor school performance,
poor life developmental skills, and lose their ability to self-regulate. As
these children age, they will have different existential memories and respond in a different manner than they would have otherwise. Consequently, society may have difficulty preserving individual safety through
an inability to decrease violence, while at the same time it has to support
unproductive or underproductive members of society. Cumulatively,
these findings support the presence of neuro-biological-developmental alterations in children witnessing DV, their ensuing PTSD, and the im-
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Paradoxically, then, the enacted laws, or their absence, and judicial
decisions that extol the nuclear family or its approximation often undermine the purported state interests in stability and permanency for
the child. Whether the two-parent household is “intact” or approximated via a forced shared custody arrangement, family stability is undermined and children are harmed by ongoing IPV, fear of contact with
the rapist, and/or triggers that reinforce trauma. The current legal paradigm forces the mother into an impossible position where leaving her
violent partner does little to protect her or her children by requiring
111
continued harmful contact through shared custody arrangements.
Similarly, in cases where a child is conceived as a result of rape, the inability to deny parentage or terminate the parental rights of the person
who committed the rape results in harmful and absurd situations where
the man who committed a violent crime—and had no intention to have
a child—may attempt to, and in some cases actually does, gain custodial
112
rights. These court-imposed custodial arrangements result in less stability for the family because children are harmed when continued contact between the parties negatively impacts a mother’s ability to parent
and affords opportunities for a father to continue his abuse.
II. Perpetuating the Nuclear Family or Its Approximation
When the overarching standard in family court is the best interest
of the child, how can the system continue to glorify the nuclear family
while blatantly ignoring research demonstrating that violence against
mothers harms children? On the one hand, it is hardly surprising that
there has not been a paradigm shift. Despite changing family composi-

pression that cumulative childhood trauma (and not adulthood trauma)
may predict the overall symptom complexity in adults.
Id. (citations omitted).
111. I do not suggest that all custody court cases result in shared custody arrangements or
that every court discounts the impact that exposure to IPV has on children. However,
courts often discount IPV and rape, hold that fathers should be involved in children’s
lives, and hold that a shared custody arrangement is in the child’s best interest. See
BARRY GOLDSTEIN & ELIZABETH LIU, REPRESENTING THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
SURVIVOR 16-18 (2d ed. 2019); Joan Meier, #Childrentoo in Family Court: The Culture of Denial 19 (G.W. L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Paper No. 2020-24, 2020)
[hereinafter Meier, #Childrentoo] https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3589328 [perma.cc/UL5R-N5YW]. Alternatively, if fathers are not afforded
shared custody, fathers who engage in abusive and controlling behaviors often obtain
significant unsupervised custodial time. Id.
112. See infra Parts III-IV.
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tions and increased public awareness about violence against women, societal attitudes towards families and violence remain largely unchanged
when it comes to parenting: “According to a 2010 Pew Report, 69% of
Americans say single mothers without male partners to help raise their
children are bad for society and 61% agree that a child needs a mother
113
and father to grow up happily.” The passage of time has done little to
change the view that both parents need to be involved in children’s lives
114
for children to succeed. A 2015 Pew Research Center survey found
comparable results to the 2010 report: “[T]wo-thirds of adults said that
more single women raising children on their own was bad for society,
115
and 48% said the same about unmarried couples raising children.”
Like the rest of society, the legal realm has steadfastly resisted a
paradigm shift, despite documented harm to children. Perpetuating the
two-parent household or its approximation in the family court system
are three independent but interrelated factors: concepts of parental
116
117
118
equality, discounting of violence against women, and gender bias.
All three of these factors together provide justification for the system
disregarding violence against mothers and the harm this violence has on
children: If, from the onset of a case, women litigants are viewed as less
credible than male litigants and allegations of IPV and sexual assault are
presumed false or unimportant, then the legal system’s default premise
that both mother and father are fit and on equal footing when entering
113. See Sara Shoener, Op-Ed, Two-Parent Households Can Be Lethal, N.Y. TIMES
(June 21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/opinion/sunday/domesticviolence-and-two-parent-households.html [https://perma.cc/W4FB-TG8M] (“Women experiencing domestic abuse are told by our culture that being a good mother
means marrying the father of her children and supporting a relationship between
them.”).
Mental health professionals, law enforcement officials, judges and members of the clergy often showed greater concern for the maintenance of a
two-parent family than for the safety of the mother and her children.
Women who left abusive men were frequently perceived at best as mothers who had not successfully kept their children out of harm’s way and at
worst as liars who were alienating children from their fathers.
Id.
114. I do not suggest that shared custody is never in a child’s best interest. Rather, when
IPV or rape has occurred, shared custody is usually not in the best interest of the
child for reasons mentioned throughout this Article.
115. GRETCHEN LIVINGSTON, PEW RSCH. CTR., THE CHANGING PROFILE OF
UNMARRIED PARENTS 4 (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2018/04
/25/the-changing-profile-of-unmarried-parents/ [https://perma.cc/E92U-NR9C].
116. See Meier, supra note 15, at 676-78.
117. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 16, 3-6.
118. See GENDER BIAS STUDY, supra note 17, at 834-47.
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119

court need not be challenged. This in turn enables the legal system to
approximate the two-parent household through laws and judicial decisions that resist terminating the parental rights of fathers whose violent
conduct has shown they are unfit and to award shared custody arrangements.
A. Factors Perpetuating the Two-Parent Paradigm
It is presumed that parents enter the family court system as
120
equals, thus, shared custody arrangements are in children’s best interests. Statutory presumptions reinforce the notion of parental equality,
including the presumption that custody not be awarded to a particular
121
parent every time (i.e., preferring mothers over fathers) and presump122
tions in favor of shared custody. Although both presumptions are facially gender neutral and appear to treat parents similarly, in practice
they favor fathers and the approximate nuclear family in cases involving
IPV and rape. A father who has exposed (and continues to expose) a
child to his ongoing abuse has already demonstrated a degree of parental
unfitness that should cause the court to question its assumption of
equality. Similarly unfit is the person who has committed rape against
the biological mother where the child was conceived as a result of his
criminal conduct. As such, any statutory or judicial presumptions of pa119. See Meier, supra note 15, at 676-80, 682-84.
120. See id. at 675-76.
121. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.13(c)(1) (2019) (“There is no presumption for or against
the father or mother of the child”); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-3 (2018) (“In all cases in
which the custody of any child is at issue between the parents, there shall be no prima-facie right to the custody of the child in the father or mother. There shall be no
presumption in favor of any particular form of custody, legal or physical, nor in favor
of either parent.”); IND. CODE § 31-17-2-8 (2018) (“In determining the best interests of the child, there is no presumption favoring either parent.”); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 23-3204 (2019) (“[T]here shall be no presumption that it is in the best interests of
any infant or young child to give custody or residency to the mother.”); 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 5327(a) (2018) (“In any action regarding the custody of the child between
the parents of the child, there shall be no presumption that custody should be awarded to a particular parent.”).
122. See In re Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d 1117, 1128 (Pa. 2016) (providing examples
of codified shared custody presumptions). For a discussion of the dangers of joint
custody presumptions in custody cases involving domestic violence, see GABRIELLE
DAVIS, KRISTINE LIZDAS, SANDRA TIBBETTS MURPHY, & JENNA YAUCH, THE
DANGERS OF PRESUMPTIVE JOINT PHYSICAL CUSTODY (2010), https://www.bwjp.org
/assets/dangers-presumptive-joint-physical-custody.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4RCUMK42]; see also generally Judith G. Greenberg, Domestic Violence and the Danger of
Joint Custody Presumptions, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 403 (2005).
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rental equality obfuscate violence against mothers and the effect it has
on children.
Overcoming statutory presumptions of parental equality is arduous
for mothers experiencing violence because the court is “obligated to ad123
judicate cases from a stance of judicial neutrality.” Adjudicating custody cases from a judicial neutrality stance means that the court views
124
“both parties as starting with equal rights to custody” when they enter
the courtroom. In cases involving allegations of IPV or rape, however,
125
parents begin on unequal footing. The presence of these allegations
126
frames the parties as “innocent victim v. evil perpetrator” before testimony is even heard; thus:
Courts may resist such allegations because to accept them can
have the effect of replacing the exercise of the court’s unconstrained discretion under the ‘best interest of the child’ test
with an implicit presumption of one party’s unfitness (effectively erasing judicial discretion). Courts are reluctant to cede
127
their discretion and judgement in this manner.
Theoretically, concepts of parental equality should not even arise in
cases involving non-intimate partner rape because the only connection
128
between the child and person committing the rape is biological. Thus,
there are no grounds to presume that the “parents” are equals or for
judges to engage in a best interest of the child analysis because the person who committed the rape never developed a relationship with the
129
130
child. Parentage, then, is nonexistent. Statutes and judicial decisions, however, create parental rights for the person who committed the
131
sexual offense.
The full extent to which parental equality and judicial neutrality affect parental rights and custody-arrangement outcomes in cases involving non-intimate partner rape is difficult to assess. News coverage of
cases and judicial decisions reported in legal reporters, however, signal

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Meier, supra note 15, at 676.
Id.
Id.
Id. (“This makes such allegations appear almost unfair, tilting the scales before the
court hears and shifts all the evidence.”).
Id. at 676-77.
See Murphy, supra note 30, at 181-82. For further discussion, see infra Parts III-IV.
Murphy, supra note 30, at 181-82.
Id.
Id.
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that notions of parental equality and judicial neutrality do affect judicial
decisions even when the only connection between the child and the per132
son who committed the rape is biological. This result is hardly surprising given the legal system’s adherence to the two-parent paradigm.
On the other hand, research suggests that the parental-equality and
judicial-neutrality frameworks do impact outcomes in custody cases involving IPV. Wisconsin enacted a statute that created a rebuttable presumption that granting joint or sole custody to an abusive parent is not
in the child’s best interest when the parent has engaged in a pattern of
133
IPV or there has been a serious incident of abuse. Despite this statutory presumption, research found that 50% of cases where one parent had
been convicted of IPV against the other parent resulted in court orders
awarding joint legal custody even though there was a documented history
of IPV evidenced by criminal convictions for felony or misdemeanor bat134
tery. Court orders for joint legal custody increased to 62% when the
135
parent who was abusive was not incarcerated. Notwithstanding evi132. Id.; see, e.g., Alabama Court Forces Rape Survivor to Allow Rapist to Have Visitation
With Children, KNOE NEWS 8 (June 12, 2019), https://www.knoe.com/content
/news/Alabama-court-forces-rape-survivor-to-allow-rapist-to-have-visitation-withchildren-511195642.html [https://perma.cc/8QHH-HWEL]; Tim Stelloh, Michigan
Judge Gives Convicted Rapist Parental Rights for Victims Sons, NBC NEWS (Oct. 9,
2017),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/michigan-judge-gives-convictedrapist-parental-rights-victim-s-son-n809196 [https://perma.cc/QCJ7-MGSU].
133. WIS. STAT. § 767.41(2)(d) (2009); Teresa E. Meuer, Tony Gibart, & Adrienne
Roach, Domestic Abuse: Little Impact on Child Custody and Placement, 91 WIS. LAW.
16, 16 (2018).
134. Meuer et al., supra note 133, at 18-19.
135. Id. at 19. Researchers also found that even though there was a history of IPV between
the parties, it was frequently not noted in the family court file. Id. at 20. This suggests
that the legal system and legal professionals were discounting the abuse and dismissing its relevance in making custody determinations.
First, only 27.4 percent of all cases include a reference to domestic abuse.
In 15 cases, documentation was inaccessible or missing. Therefore, data
on the references to domestic violence in those cases is incomplete. While
our file reviewers did not have access to sealed documents, nor could they
access many transcripts, the lack of written references to domestic abuse
appears significant. Institutions, especially courts, “are organized and coordinated, for the most part, by means of standardized texts or standardized protocols for producing texts.” If acts of domestic abuse within a
family are not routinely noted in family law case files, it suggests that
Wisconsin family law case processing does not systematically account for
abuse.
Second, even when a [guardian ad litem] or parties’ lawyers are involved,
written references to domestic abuse are absent in more than one-half of
cases. When the victim had a lawyer or a [guardian ad litem] was ap-
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dence of parental unfitness based on a documented history of violence
and a presumption against shared custody, courts still adhered to the
nuclear family paradigm because of the power of the parental equality
presumption.
By analyzing cases through a parental-equality and judicialneutrality framework, the legal system reinforces the two-parent paradigm. Unfortunately, this framework and paradigm perpetuate violence
against women and risk to children because fathers’ rights are not only
preserved but even heightened in cases involving IPV or rape, where the
fathers have demonstrated parental unfitness. Paradoxically, the legal
system creates more instability and harm for children by fallaciously
viewing parents as “equals” even in light of evidence to the contrary.
B. Discounting of IPV and Rape
The legal system’s blatant discounting of IPV and sexual assault
further strengthens the nuclear family paradigm and parental-equality
framework. If the family court system discounts the violence outright or
believes it impacts the mother but not the child, then it can continue to
136
view parents as equals and justify results that approximate a twoparent household. In addition to the legal system discounting the violence outright, women’s testimony on IPV and rape—and the effects on
children—is frequently disbelieved in family court and in society. This
doubt stems primarily from three differing false narratives: Women fabricate violence to obtain custody of their children; women who do not
resemble the prototypical IPV or rape victim are lying; and even if allegations of IPV or rape are credible, there is no consequence or harm to
the child.

pointed, 39 percent and 42 percent of cases referenced domestic violence.
Formal domestic abuse findings were much less frequent. Domestic abuse
findings were made in only 17 percent (23) of cases with a [guardian ad
litem]. In over 60 percent of cases in which the victim had representation, the lawyer did not reference domestic violence. These statistics suggest that legal professionals tend to see histories of domestic abuse as irrelevant, unimportant, or unnecessary for courts to make decisions.
Id. at 20-21 (citations omitted).
136. Meier, supra note 15, at 680-81.
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1. Fabricating Abuse to Gain Custody
137

Despite increased public awareness regarding IPV and rape, a
commonly held societal assumption that allegations of IPV and rape are
138
false permeates the family court system. Compounding the effects of
this assumption is the added belief that mothers make up these false allegations of abuse as a means to gain custody.
Violence against women, however, is far more likely to be underreported than falsely reported. Research has frequently relied on police reports to study the prevalence of false reporting in cases involving sexual
139
assault. The problem with this approach is that such studies often fail
to account for how law enforcement officials frequently believe that allegations of rape are false from the outset of the investigation:
“[I]nvestigators start from the proposition that the complainant is lying

137. Media attention continues to raise discussions and public awareness about IPV and
rape, as seen with the Brett Kavanaugh Senate confirmation hearings. See Sherly Gay
Stolberg, & Nicholas Fandos, Brett Kavanaugh and Christine Blasey Duel With Tears
and Fury, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/27/us
/politics/brett-kavanaugh-confirmation-hearings.html
[https://perma.cc/C49T46VD]; see also Domenico Montanaro, Poll: More Believe Ford than Kavanaugh, a
Cultural Shift from 1991, NPR (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/03
/654054108/poll-more-believe-ford-than-kavanaugh-a-cultural-shift-from-1991
[https://perma.cc/ZBp7-VM4P]. Even with increased public attention, however, the
public still questions women’s credibility, as evidenced by the varying reactions to
Dr. Christine Blasey Ford’s testimony, including President Donald Trump’s mocking
of her and her testimony. Id.; see also Allie Malloy, Kate Sullivan, & Jeff Zeleny,
Trump Mocks Christine Blasey Ford’s Testimony, Tells People to ‘Think of Your Son,’
CNN (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/02/politics/trump-mockschristine-blasey-ford-kavanaugh-supreme-court/index.html [https://perma.cc/ALQ3N8RJ]; Mary Grace Hebert, Media Narratives of Sexual Violence of Sexual Violence
During the Ford and Kavanaugh Testimonies, NAT’L COMMC’N ASSOC. (Jan. 2, 2020),
https://www.natcom.org/communication-currents/media-narratives-sexual-violenceduring-ford-and-kavanaugh-testimonies [https://perma.cc/TES6-J32V]. Discounting
women’s allegations of sexual violence occurs globally as well. See, e.g., Li Yuan, In
China, a Viral Video Sets Off a Challenge to Rape Culture, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/05/business/china-richard-liu-rape-videometoo.html [https://perma.cc/Z6MD-UESR]. In China, the release of a heavily edited video discrediting a woman who accused a Chinese businessman of raping her
went viral. The video, titled “Proof of a Gold Digger Trap?” used subtitles to blame
the woman and suggested that she could not have been raped because she “showed
the man the elevator,” she “pushed the floor button voluntarily,” and she “gestured
an invitation.” Id. Missing from the edited video was what happened after the woman
and the businessman exited the elevator. Id.
138. Meier, supra note 15, at 682-85; see Tuerkhiemer, supra note 16, at 3.
139. Tuerkheimer, supra note 16, at 17.
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140

and act to confirm this belief.” Acting to confirm their presupposition
that rape allegations are not credible, police “promptly disregard[ ],
[and] short-circuit[ ] sexual assault investigations well before the oppor141
tunity to gather available corroborative evidence is exhausted.” Thus
law enforcement’s preconceived belief that rape allegations are not true
from the start of the investigation results in inflated numbers of false re142
ports as cases are deemed false before being fully investigated.
Researchers have treated victims’ recantations of sexual assault as
evidence that they lied, which has also inflated the number of false re143
ports. But victims may recant truthful allegations of rape for myriad
reasons including fear of retaliation, belief that law enforcement will not
144
act, or embarrassment. Thus, “[s]ince many factors may cause a truthful complainant to recant her allegation, a failure to independently assess the underlying accusations tends to result in findings of false report145
ing rates that are misleadingly high.” “Independent evaluations of
[rape] reports deemed unfounded by the police,” however, provide more
146
accurate assessments of the rate of false reporting. Studies utilizing this
method—which involves “researchers review[ing] the complete police
file”—found that false reporting rates were significantly lower than be147
lieved by law enforcement and society.
The rate of false reporting in cases involving IPV is similarly lower
than societal assumptions suggest. Indeed, “the rate of false reports in

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 33.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 17.
HEATHER HUHTANEN, ATT’Y GEN.’S SEXUAL ASSAULT TASK FORCE, FALSE
ALLEGATIONS, CASE UNFOUNDING AND VICTIM RECANTATIONS IN THE CONTEXT
OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 1-3 (2008), https://www.evawintl.org/Library/DocumentLibrary
Handler.ashx?id=618 [https://perma.cc/C549-29YY].
145. Tuerkheimer, supra note 16, at 17.
146. Id. at 18-20.
147. Id. at 19-20 n.96. Studies found that the rate of false reporting was between 4.5%
and 6.8%. Others argue that the rate of false reporting is anywhere from 2% to 10%.
E.g. Cameron Kimble & Inimai Chettiar, Sexual Assault Remains Dramatically Unreported, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org
/blog/sexual-assault-remains-dramatically-underreported [https://perma.cc/DZJ4NYJ8]. As an example of the disparity between actual rates of false reporting and perceived reporting rates, one study found that “more than half of the detectives interviewed believed that 40 to 80 percent of sexual assaults complaint were false.” Tuerkheimer, supra note 16, at 16.
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custody disputes is no greater than for any other crimes.” The legal
system, however, consistently discredits IPV because it assumes that
149
mothers fabricate claims of abuse at a high rate.
Speaking the truth about violence, then, can backfire in the family
legal system to the detriment of the child. When a mother discloses IPV
or rape to the court in an effort to show that a father is unfit and that
exposure to him through custody arrangements will be harmful to the
child, she risks the court assuming that she fabricated the abuse based
on these inaccurate assumptions about false reporting. In turn, this can
150
(and often does ) result in the court viewing her as a vindictive and,
therefore, unfit parent. This results in unfit fathers gaining even more or
151
significant custodial time with the children.
2. The Reinforcement of Unbelievable Mothers: Victim Prototypes
Measuring women against prototypes of victims based on societal
152
stereotypes also heightens fathers’ rights and the two-parent paradigm.
Prototypes help people “process[] information, draw[] conclusions,
153
and . . . make[] sense of the world.” By defining both what is typical
and atypical, prototypes “set the standard by which others are

148. Cynthia Grover Hastings, Letting Down Their Guard: What Guardians Ad Litem
Should Know About Domestic Violence and Custody Disputes, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 283, 306 n.151 (2004).
149. Meier, supra note 15, at 684-85.
150. See April M. Zeoli Echo A. Rivera, Cris M. Sullivan & Sheryl Kubiak, PostSeparation Abuse of Women and Their Children: Boundary-Setting and Family Court
Utilization Among Victimized Mothers, 28(6) J. FAM. VIOLENCE 547, 547-50 (2013).
(“When women make allegations of IPV or express concerns that fathers will harm
children, the court often views them as obstructing the court process and the father’s
right to have a relationship with their children”); see also Meier, #Childrentoo, supra
note 111, at 1-2. I have also witnessed this firsthand.
151. I am not suggesting that mothers should not inform the court of the IPV. In fact, it is
imperative that litigants provide the court with the full contextual history of the violence. I raise this point to illustrate the barriers that mothers encounter in the court
system and the absurdity that results when the court discredits mothers’ allegations of
IPV and rape.
152. See Prewitt, supra note 29 (providing a description of prototypes for rape victims and
the rights of fathers).
153. Id. at 837(quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1125 (2004)).
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154

judged.” Victim prototypes are problematic because they fail to account for the full range of victim experiences and they are not “statisti155
cally or descriptively accurate.” When a victim does not “fit” the prototype she is not believed to be credible.
In cases involving rape, the prevailing cultural script is that of the
stranger-rape prototype—“a black stranger attacking a white woman in
156
public using overwhelming force.” Statistics reveal that in contrast to
this stereotype, most rapes are actually committed by a known assailant
of the same race as the victim and the victim does not sustain physical
157
injuries from the rape. As such, this prototype actually describes the
158
atypical rape case. Yet:
Because it depicts what societal rhetoric argues ought to constitute “real rape” instead of what typically and statistically
constitutes the majority of nonconsensual sex experiences,
the [stranger-]rape prototype . . . “distorts decisions about
whether specific instances belong in the [rape] category” in a
biased way. Moreover, it conveys that nonconsensual sexual
experiences differing from the stranger-rape prototype constitute harm that is not merely different but that ought to be
treated as less “real,” less “substantial,” and less “worthy of le159
gal redress.”

154. Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747,
787 (2001)).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 838.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Chamallas, supra note 154, at 779-80).
Where less force is used or no other physical injury is inflicted, where
threats are inarticulate, where the two know each other, where the setting
is not an alley but a bedroom, where the initial contact was not a kidnapping but a date, where the woman says no but does not fight, the understanding is different. In such cases, the law as reflected in the opinions of
the courts, the interpretations, if not the words, of the statutes, and the
decisions of those within the criminal justice system, often tell us that no
crime has taken place . . . .
Id. at 839 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J.
1087, 1092 (1986)).
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When rape results in pregnancy, a pregnant-raped-woman prototype
160
emerges. This prototype depicts
the typical or prototypical raped woman as someone who
views her unborn child as an extension of her rapist and as
perpetuating the violence against her from within; whose
healing from the rape is so intertwined with her ability to
prevent the pregnancy or birth of her rape-conceived child
that, even if she self-identifies as strongly pro-life, she supports measures intended to terminate her pregnancy; and
whose hatred toward her unborn child is so natural that ex161
traordinary measures are needed.
The pregnant-raped-woman prototype, similar to the stranger-rape prototype, describes how pregnant rape victims ought to behave: She must
162
abort her baby because her baby symbolizes the person who raped her.
Where a victim behaves differently, i.e., choosing to keep and love the
child, her allegations of rape and conception as a result of rape are less
163
believable. Acting inconsistently with the pregnant-raped-woman prototype results in society “labeling . . . these women as ‘impostor rape victims’—that is, women who are likely falsifying their rape allegations and
164
the facts about the conceptions of their children.”
Cultural prototypes concerning rape are no less persistent in the
law. A family court judge recently questioned whether a rape had occurred because the woman had not been held at gunpoint and attacked
165
by strangers. Similarly, numerous legislators have opined that certain
rapes that do not fit this narrative are illegitimate or unbelievable: Missouri Representative Todd Akin suggested that a woman cannot get
166
pregnant from a “legitimate rape;” Missouri Representative Barry

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 840.
Id. at 848.
Id. at 851.
Id. at 858.
Id.
Luis Ferré-Sadurní, Teenager Accused of Rape Deserves Leniency Because He’s from a
‘Good Family,’ Judge Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com
/2019/07/02/nyregion/judge-james-troiano-rape.html?searchResultPosition=3
[https://perma.cc/FRQ4-E5YM].
166. Charlotte Alter, Todd Akin Still Doesn’t Get What’s Wrong with Saying ‘Legitimate
Rape,’ TIME (July 17, 2014, 4:07 PM), https://time.com/3001785/todd-akinlegitimate-rape-msnbc-child-of-rape/ [https://perma.cc/7MWJ-BNH7].
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Hovis used the phrase “consensual rape” during a debate; Wisconsin
State Assembly member Roger Rivard stated that “some girls rape easi168
ly;” and Pennsylvania Senate candidate Tom Smith commented that
his daughter’s out-of-wedlock conception, which resulted from consen169
sual sex, was the same as conception as a result of rape.
Reliance on the stranger-rape and pregnant-raped-woman prototypes
permits the legal system to dismiss women’s allegations of rape and
therefore justifies granting persons who committed sexual assault parenting rights when children are conceived as a result of the criminal offense. If rape does not occur according to the cultural script, the legal
system can conclude that parenting rights should exist and that terminating parental rights should not occur or only occur in limited contexts.
Similar to cases involving rape, a prevailing cultural script emerges
for cases of IPV. In IPV cases, the prototype is that of the helplesswoman—a cowering badly bruised woman who is in denial about the
170
violence she experiences and never reacts to it. Physical violence, however, is only one tactic that men who engage in abusive behaviors use to
171
control their partners, and physical abuse may or may not result in
172
observable injury. Moreover, women usually do react to violence in

167. Orion Donovan-Smith, A GOP Lawmaker Used the Phrase ‘Consensual Rape’ During
Abortion Debate. He Says He Misspoke, WASH. POST (May 17, 2019, 7:29 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/05/17/gop-lawmaker-used-phraseconsensual-rape-during-abortion-debate-he-says-he-misspoke/?utm [https://perma.cc
/L6ZB-LJYE].
168. Molly Reilly, Roger Rivard, Wisconsin Legislator, Criticized Over ‘Some Girls Rape Easy’
Remark, HUFFPOST (Oct. 11, 2012, 10:22 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry
/roger-rivard-rape_n_1956491 [https://perma.cc/6SSU-A3BU].
169. Gregory J. Krieg, Pa. Senate Candidate Backs Off Unplanned Pregnancy-Rape Comparison, ABC NEWS (Aug. 27, 2012), https://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/08
/pa-senate-candidate-backs-off-unplanned-pregnancy-rape-comparison/
[https://
perma.cc/6E6W-LGEU].
170. SHERRY HAMBY, BATTERED WOMEN’S PROTECTIVE STRATEGIES: STRONGER THAN
YOU KNOW 1-2 (2014).
171. Men who engage in coercive behaviors employ a range of tactics to control their
partner including physical, sexual, psychological, and economic abuse; threats; intimidation; sleep deprivation; and isolation. See Stark, supra note 12, at 986.
172. The racialized cultural script that has emerged for a black woman is that of an “uncontrollable, promiscuous black woman who is capable of sustaining greater physical
abuse than her white counterpart and is herself capable of violence.” Erika Sussman
& Sara Wee, Accounting for Survivor’s Economic Security: An Atlas for Direct Service
Providers, CTR. FOR SURVIVOR AGENCY & JUSTICE 43 (2016), https://csaj.org
/document-library/CSAJ_Atlas_Mapbook_1_FINAL_TO_POST.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6QR5-PSFD] (citing Zanita E. Fenton, Domestic Violence in Black
and White: Racialized Gender Stereotypes in Gender Violence, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER &
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173

some manner at some point in time. When a woman does not have
physical injuries or she reacts to the violence, countering the prevailing
cultural script, the legal system can conclude that the IPV must not have
occurred, so TPR is inappropriate and a shared custody arrangement is
in the best interest of the child.
A judge’s ruling in a protection order case exemplifies how the
helpless-woman prototype impacts legal outcomes. Although the judge
granted an order of protection against the abusive individual, the order
of protection was only for six months because the woman did not have
any broken bones or bruises and had once thrown a toy out of frustra174
tion in response to the abuse. Here the woman did not conform to
the helpless-woman prototype—she did not have observable injuries and
she reacted to the abuse. The fact that she did not fit the prevailing societal view of how a victim of IPV ought to appear and behave resulted in
the judge determining that her case ought to be treated as less worthy of
significant legal redress.
The helpless-woman prototype, like the stranger-rape and pregnantraped-woman prototypes, provides grounds for states to resist terminating
the parental rights of fathers who continually expose children to IPV
and to award these fathers significant custodial time. By relying on this
prototype, the legal system constantly discounts the violence and treats
any violence or behavior that does not fit into the helpless-women prototype as less real or less substantial. The legal system can then reasonably
conclude that there is no harm to the child. As a result of this discounting, courts place both parents on equal footing when they enter custody
court, even though the father has already shown he is unfit, and award
custody arrangements that approximate the nuclear family despite the
risk of harm to children.

L. 54 (1998)). This racialized gender stereotype provides even more grounds for the
legal system to discount IPV against a black woman as the legal system treats the violence against her as inconsequential because she can “sustain” it and/or she herself is
“violent” so she “deserves” it. See id. (noting that black women experiencing IPV are
frequently subjected to dual arrests and prosecution as a result of the IPV).
173. Suzanne C. Swan & David L. Snow, The Development of a Theory of Women’s Use of
Violence in Intimate Relationships, 12 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1026, 1027
(2006).
174. I observed this case in open court; as far as I am aware there is no written opinion
from the case.
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3. Judicial Failure to Recognize Harm to Children
Even when the legal system acknowledges IPV and rape, judicial
decisions still afford little weight to that violence in deciding family law
matters. Judges choose to disregard the effect violence has on children
by suggesting that there is no harm to the child if the child was not the
direct object of the abuse and that the child is safe if the parents have
separated. Courts credit the abuse against mothers but refuse to recognize how exposure to that violence harms children and affects mothers’
ability to parent. In turn, this allows courts to continue to justify presumptions of parental equality, resulting in custody awards that approximate the nuclear family, resistance to terminating the parental rights of
men who are violent, and adherence to the two-parent paradigm. Thus,
this deliberate judicial failure to recognize the harm to children justifies
creating less stable family units, perpetuating violence.
Courts excuse the violence when the child is not the direct object
of the abuse and when the parents have separated for myriad reasons.
Courts measure women against prototypes of victims based on stereotypes and view the violence as less legitimate whenever a mother behaves
differently than the prototype, resulting in the conclusion that the vio175
lence was minimal and did not affect the children. Courts further
hold mothers “responsible for whatever harm her children suffer from”
the parent who is abusive because she remained in the abusive relation176
ship, “‘putting up with’ the abuse.” Courts then conclude that the
mother and her children are not deserving of protection from the offending parent because the “mother has already ‘tolerated’ or ‘subjected’
177
the child to the . . . abuse.”
A case litigated in Pennsylvania illustrates how a court can credit an
account of violence while failing to structure a custody award that accounts for this violence. The woman fled from the relationship after enduring years of physical, emotional, and financial abuse, including her
178
boyfriend strangling her and slamming her head on the floor. After
she fled, her boyfriend exploited the court system to further control and
abuse her by filing and obtaining a temporary protection order against

175.
176.
177.
178.

See supra Part II.A.
Meier, supra note 15, at 701 n.150.
Id.
Guardian Ad Litem’s Memorandum to the Court at 1, McCartney v. Moore, No.
2018-FC-40225 (Lackawanna Cty. Ct. Com. Pl.).
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her, which provided that she was not allowed any contact with their
daughter. At the time, their daughter was still breastfeeding and had
never been separated from her mother. The judge appointed a guardian
ad litem (GAL) in the case. In her report and recommendation to the
court, the GAL reported that the father was very abusive and controlling
and that he had a history of abusing prior girlfriends and family members. The GAL, however, still recommended a shared custody arrangement. Her recommendation was based on two illogical and disturbing
conclusions: 1) It would be confusing for the child to be taken from her
father because she had been in his care due to the temporary protection
order, even though the father had falsely filed the temporary protection
order, and 2) the mother having sole custody would put the mother and
the child more at risk because the father would become angry if he lost
custody.
Presumably, other unstated factors that contributed to this recommendation were that the child was safe because she was not a direct object of the abuse and the parents were separated. Though the judge
acknowledged that the father had engaged in litigation abuse and was
also physically abusive, he agreed with the GAL and ordered shared custody. Here the GAL and court credited the violence as it occurred to the
mother, but still awarded equal parenting.
In cases of non-intimate partner rape in which a child is conceived
as a result of the sexual offense, the court may be even more likely to
disregard the effects of that violence on a child—even when it acknowledges that violence—when determining parental rights and custodial
time. A court may easily conclude that there is no risk of harm to the
child if the person who committed the sexual offense is awarded parental rights and custodial time because the assault occurred before the
child was born. Courts justify this conclusion because the child was not
directly physically or sexually abused, the mother and the person who
committed the rape are separated, and the child was not exposed to the
violence. A problem with this conclusion, however, is that custody arrangements that expose a mother to the person who violated her may
negatively affect the mother’s parenting, which in turns impacts the
179. See Temporary Order at 1, McCartney v. Moore, No. 2018-FC-40225 (Lackawanna
Cty. Ct. Com. Pl.). In Pennsylvania, a temporary order of protection is granted or
denied at an ex parte proceeding, which is a legal hearing without both parties being
present. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6107 (2018). A person seeking a protection order
completes a petition, files it with the court, and affirms that all statements contained
in the petition are true. The court will grant a temporary protection order without
hearing from the party the petition is filed against until the hearing date, which is
scheduled within ten days.
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child. Thus, the child is still harmed by the violence, even though they
180
are not directly exposed to it. Additionally, the person who committed the rape may use custody as a means to further threaten, intimidate,
181
and abuse the biological mother, which affects the child. Despite these
documented issues, courts frequently fail to analyze how violence, and
the continuous exposure to a person who is or was violent, impacts parenting and harms children. Courts often erroneously conclude that the
mother has poor parenting skills rather than recognizing that her parenting abilities are affected by repeated exposure to the person who vio182
lated her.
Decisions crediting the violence as to the mother but discounting
its effect on the children permit judges to place both parents on equal
footing: If the violence is viewed as impacting only the mother, then
both parties can equally parent the child. From this viewpoint, the court
preserves the notion of parental equality. This, in turn, upholds the nuclear family paradigm as the legal system concludes that parents are
equally fit to care for the child. This mindset has remained steadfast despite research to the contrary.
C. Gender Bias
Gender bias further impacts judicial decisions in family law cases to
the detriment of mothers and children. Despite the popular misconception that mothers are favored in custody cases, research has found that
mothers are “often measured against the standard of ideal motherhood,
183
while fathers are measured against a different and lower standard,” resulting in “courts consistently [holding] mothers to higher standards of
184
proof than fathers.” Mothers are also “evaluated on their actual histo-

180.
181.
182.
183.

See supra Part I.B.
H.B. 1257, supra note 88.
See BANCROFT ET AL., supra note 13, at 84-89.
GENDER BIAS STUDY, supra note 17, at 833 (“The courts, as in the rest of society,
expect far more from women as caretakers than as men. Any shortcomings the woman has, whether directly relating to her parenting or not, are closely scrutinized.
Whereas, if a father does anything by way of caring for his children, this is an indication of his devotion and commitment.” (quotation marks omitted) (quoting testimony of Sheera Strick of Greater Boston Legal Services)); id. at 832 (“A woman’s history
of motherhood is subject to intense scrutiny. A father’s history of fatherhood is only
examined from the time of the petition.” (quotation marks omitted) (quoting an unnamed Boston attorney)).
184. Meier, supra note 15, at 687 (citing CARRIE CUTHBERT, KIM SLOTE, MONICA
GHOSH DRIGGERS, CYNTHIA J. MESH, LUNDY BANCROFT & JAY SILVERMAN,
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ry of performance as parents and fathers evaluated on the basis of their
expressions of their emotions and their stated intentions for the fu185
ture.” When fathers actively seek custody, they obtain primary or
186
shared custody over 70% of the time.
In addition to being held to a higher parenting standard, “credibility accorded [women] litigants is less than that accorded to [men as] liti187
gants in domestic violence cases.” This unfair credibility burden results in mothers having to offer more evidence than fathers in
188
hearings. This burden makes it more difficult for mothers to prove the
IPV and its impact on children because IPV is often not witnessed by
others or reported to the police.
Mothers are also judged harshly for remaining in an abusive rela189
tionship and “failing to protect” their children. One judge in Pennsylvania, for instance, consistently remarks that a mother cannot possibly
be concerned for the safety of her children if she leaves them in the care
190
of their father, who she is alleging is abusive. This remark simultaneously discounts the mother’s allegations of IPV and blames her for failing to protect her children, even though there are myriad reasons she
left the children in the father’s care. Reasons that a mother may leave
children in the care of a father who is abusive include lack of housing,
lack of financial resources to care for the children, and threats from the

185.
186.
187.

188.

189.

190.

BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT: A HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE AND CHILD CUSTODY IN THE MASSACHUSETTS FAMILY COURTS (2002)).
BANCROFT ET AL., supra note 13, at 148.
GENDER BIAS STUDY, supra note 17, at 748.
Meier, supra note 15, at 687 (citing Karen Czapanskiy, Domestic Violence, the Family,
and the Lawyering Process: Lessons from Studies on Gender Bias in the Courts, 27 FAM.
L.Q. 247, 255-58 (1993)).
Id. at 688. (“[I]n rape and domestic violence cases, a female comes to court in Georgia bearing a credibility burden, a burden based on a stereotypic view of gender that
does not affect males in the same way. The effect of undue skepticism frequently
places female litigants in a position where they must offer more evidence than do
male litigants.”) (citing Czapanskiy, supra note 187, at 255-58).
BANCROFT ET AL., supra note 13, at 149. Many states have “failure to protect” statutes in their Child Protective Services Codes, see, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 28710(2)(b) (2019); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6303(b.1) (2018)) or Criminal Codes. See,
e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3623 (2018); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-221(a)
(2013); MINN. STAT. § 609.378(b)(1)(2018). These statutes are counterproductive in
cases involving IPV because it is often political and societal structures that impede a
woman’s ability to remain free from violence because she does not have the resources
to leave the abusive household. See generally Sussman, supra note 172, at 4, 34. These
can be compounded by broader systemic issues as livable wages and lack of affordable
housing. Id. at 14, 17, 34.
This comes from personal knowledge, as I have practiced in front of this judge frequently.
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191

father. Once parents separate, however, a “societal reversal tends to
take place” around mothers protecting their children: Courts “become
suspicious of a mother’s motives for attempting to protect her children
and may attribute children’s symptoms [i.e., fear of father] to the mother’s alleged anxiety, overprotectiveness, or vindictiveness against the al192
leged abuser.”
Mothers are further scrutinized when they have acted as the prima193
ry caretaker for minor children. Theoretically, state statutes and court
decisions recognize that, when determining the best interests of the
child, consideration should be given “to the parent who has been the
194
primary caretaker and psychological parent.” In practice, however, the
opposite occurs:
[I]t appears that as soon as physical custody is contested, any
weight given to a history of primary caretaking disappears.
Mothers who have been primary caretakers throughout the
child’s life are subjected to differential and stricter scrutiny,
and they may lose custody if the role of primary caretaker has
been assumed, however briefly and for whatever reason, by
195
someone else.
Presumptions about parental equality, credibility discounting, and gender bias all operate to justify decisions within the legal system that uphold violent fathers’ rights via the two-parent paradigm or its approximation. When women litigants are viewed as less credible and IPV is
discounted, judges can and do see both parents as fit, and thus capable
of substantial custodial time with the child. As seen, however, when IPV
or rape is present, both parents are not fit nor are they on equal footing
when they enter the courtroom. Strict adherence to this paradigm is detrimental to children due to the resulting heightening of fathers’ parental
rights and creation of unstable family units.
Enacted statutes and judicial decisions relating to TPR and custody
decisions in cases involving IPV or rape continue to afford mothers and
children limited protections against violence. Limited protections exist
because most statutes allow judicial discretion in determining whether
parental rights should be terminated or what custody arrangement is
191. See, e.g., Why Do Victims Stay?, NATIONAL COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, https://ncadv.org/why-do-victims-stay [https://perma.cc/7G53-94ZF].
192. BANCROFT ET AL., supra note 13, at 149.
193. GENDER BIAS STUDY, supra note 17, at 748.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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best for the child. As seen, however, judges view both parents as fit from
the start of the case and engage in credibility discounting and gender bias, resulting in decisions that are not in the best interest of the children.
Adherence to these invidious assumptions perpetuates the erroneous belief that the two-parent paradigm or its approximation is the best family
structure for children.
Unfortunately, limited protections vis-à-vis laws and judicial decisions result in a perpetuation of violence. The next section provides an
overview of existing TPR and custody statutes and a discussion of how
these statutes continue to perpetuate violence against mothers and children. The custody statutes are limited to situations where the child is
conceived as a result of rape.
III. In 2020, There’s Still Limited Protection
Inscribed in our legal system is “the maxim that a wrongdoer shall
196
not profit from his wrong.” In practice, this maxim is codified though
legal principles that prevent individuals who have committed offenses
from benefiting from their transgressions such as the right to confiscate
197
proceeds of a crime and the right to deny spousal support to a spouse
198
who has engaged in conduct harmful to the innocent spouse. For
TPR and custody in cases where a child is conceived as a result of rape
or IPV is involved, however, the legal system has overwhelmingly—and
blatantly—disregarded this maxim. This is so despite the violent nature
of the behavior and the ongoing impact of the IPV and/or rape on both
mothers and children. A biological link to a child alone does not grant a
constitutional right to parentage; a parent only has a constitutionally
protected right to custody and control of a child when they have an es199
tablished relationship with the child. Yet many states have enacted
laws that “create[] [parental] rights for rapists that did not previously ex-

196. Peña v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 900 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Prewitt, supra note 29, at
835-36 n.56.
197. See e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981 (2018).
198. See e.g., S.M.C. v. W.P.C., 44 A.3d 1181, 1185 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (“A long recognized exception to the obligation to pay spousal support exists where the recipient
spouse conducts him or herself in a manner that would constitute grounds for a faultbased divorce.”). Examples of grounds for fault-based divorce include adultery, willful
abandonment for a period of one or more years, “cruel and barbarous” treatment to
the innocent spouse, and the imposition of a sentence to imprisonment for two or
more years. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3301(a) (2010).
199. Peña, 84 F.3d at 899-900.
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200

ist.” The creation of such statutorily created rights has limited protections for mothers seeking to terminate the rights of their attackers or to
deny or limit their custodial time. Additionally, most states have failed
201
to even codify exposure to IPV as grounds for TPR, while judicial de202
cisions in custody cases disregard the violence. As discussed, this resistance to denying parentage or to enacting TPR or custody statutes
that afford protections for mothers and children stems from the entrenched two-parent paradigm and the presumptions that reinforce it.
The enactment of state statutes denying parentage or permitting
TPR when a child is conceived as a result of rape has frequently involved long, arduous battles. In Maryland, for example, a bill permitting
the termination of a rapist’s parental rights was not enacted until 2018
203
despite being introduced in legislative sessions since 2007. Prior attempts to pass the bill had been stalled on more than one occasion by
204
all-male subcommittees. In Pennsylvania, a bill to permit TPR when a

200. Murphy, supra note 30, at 172. Murphy astutely contends that convicted rapists do
not have parental rights because biology alone does not create parentage:
The idea that a convicted rapist has parental rights over the product of
his crime assumes that parentage is biological. However, as the United
States Supreme Court noted many years ago in a discussion regarding
parentage, “[T]he mere existence of a biological link does not merit constitutional protection” (Lehr v. Robertson) . . . More recently, courts
have held that biology, while relevant, does not create parental rights.
(A.R. v. C.R.; R.R. v. M.H., 1998). In fact, biology alone does not establish even minimal due process rights to notice and a hearing in family
court to determine whether parentage exists as a matter of law for the
sperm donor or man participating in assistive reproductive technologies.
(In the Matter of J.S.V., 1998).
If a biological sperm donor “father” who is not a rapist has no parental
rights in a surrogacy case, or when a court is considering placing his biological offspring up for adoption, then surely a convicted rapist has no
better rights over a child born from his crime. Simply put, a rapist should
be seen as a violent sperm donor, nothing more, because a biological
connection to a child caused by rape is as legally distant from nature of
fatherhood as a man can get.
Id. at 181-82.
201. See Haddix, supra note 97, at 760-61.
202. See supra Part II.
203. Eric Cox, Maryland Poised to Let Rape Victims Terminate Parental Rights of Their Assailants, BALTIMORE SUN (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news
/maryland/politics/bs-md-parental-rights-rapists-20180130-story.html.
(quoting
Democrat Kathleen Dumias as saying, “It’s been such a long, hard fought battle.”).
204. Kelly Weill, All-Male Panel Fails to End Maryland Law that Forces Women to Share
Custody with Their Rapist, DAILY BEAST (May 5, 2017, 2:30 PM),
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child is conceived as a result of a sexual offense without the requirement
205
of a contemplated adoption was finally enacted into law in October of
2020 after being stalled in subcommittees for several years, despite legis206
lators seemingly being appalled that the right did not already exist.
Even where states have enacted TPR statutes addressing rape, the
legal protections those statutes afford to mothers are still rather limited
in practice. To date, thirty-three states permit TPR or denial of parent207
age when a child is conceived as a result of a sexual offense. Eleven of
those states only permit termination when the other parent is convicted
208
of a sexual offense. A conviction requirement renders the statute moot

https://www.thedailybeast.com/all-male-panel-fails-to-end-maryland-law-that-forceswomen-to-share-custody-with-their-rapists [https://perma.cc/6UCZ-4LDF].
But while the bill passed both Maryland’s House and Senate, the bill’s
text varied between the two legislative bodies. On Monday, the last day
of legislative session, a five-person negotiating group was set to decide on
the bill’s final text, the Baltimore Sun reported. Instead, the five-man
group let the bill fall by the wayside, running out the legislative session’s
clock without finalizing the bill’s text.
Id.
205. Though I agree with Murphy, supra note 30, that biology alone does not create parentage and TPR statutes are problematic because they create this right, several reasons
existed for seeking to change Pennsylvania’s TPR statute. First, prior to the 2019 Superior Court decision in In re Z.E., Pennsylvania permitted TPR when a child was
conceived as a result in rape or incest but only in cases where there was a contemplated adoption. See discussion supra Part I. Second, when laws and judicial opinions are
continuously granting rights to men who rape, discounting violence against women,
and disregarding the notion that biology alone does not equate parentage for the reasons discussed in Part II, statutes that afford TPR at least provide mothers the ability
to seek termination. Lastly, in cases involving intimate partner rape or incest, the rapist may have established some type of relationship with the child beyond a biological
connection. See Peña v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 899-901 (7th Cir. 1996). As such, the
rapist would arguably be able to establish due process rights to notice and a hearing
and that he has a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of the child. Id.
206. H.B. 1984, 2019 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2020).
207. See Tables A, B, and D.
208. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2271(a)(12) (Supp. 2019); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292.02(4)
(2019); NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.105(1)(b)(8) (2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170C:5-a (Supp. 2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1111(a)(11) (2019); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 27-20-44(1)(e) (2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.510(1) (2019); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 63-7-2570(11) (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-113(g)(10) (2017 & Supp.
2020); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-309(a)(ix) (2019). See Table A for a condensed
summary of relevant statutory language and notes for these statutes. A more detailed
version of Table A may be found at jclewisesq.wordpress.com (select the Resource
Tab and then The Stability Paradox, Table A). Other resources providing lists of state
TPR statutes include Parental Rights and Sexual Assault, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, https://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/parental-rights-
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for most survivors. “Rape is the most underreported violent crime” and
209
few cases are prosecuted, resulting in minimal convictions. “Researchers estimate that of 100 forcible rapes that are committed, approximately five to twenty will be reported, 0.4 to 5.4 will be prosecuted, and 0.2
210
to 5.2 will result in a conviction.” Additionally, these states are silent
as to whether the conviction may be for a crime in “which the underly211
ing basis was sexual assault.” Under these statutes, it is unclear whether TPR could occur in cases where a woman was sexually assaulted but
the person who raped her was convicted of a different crime. Since
many cases are pled to lessor offenses, this means that even where a conviction occurs a woman may still not have the option to seek TPR in
states where a conviction is required if the offender was not ultimately
convicted of sexual assault.
Furthermore, many TPR statutes affirmatively permit judicial discretion in determining whether to terminate parental rights by providing that the judge “may” terminate parental rights and/or the judge
must make a finding that termination is in the best interest of the
212
child. Since these statutes allow judicial discretion in deciding whether to terminate a parent’s rights, all TPR outcomes are based on a
judge’s determination of what the judge thinks is best for the child. As
discussed in Part II, however, judges often disregard violence in making
their best interest of the child determinations because they are influenced by the parental equality framework, credibility discounting, and
213
gender bias. Presumptions about these factors, in turn, uphold the
glorified nuclear family paradigm. Most mothers, then, will have no recourse to terminate their offenders’ parental rights in these states.

209.
210.
211.

212.
213.

and-sexual-assault.aspx [https://perma.cc/BP2K-YF8Q] and Termination of Parental
Rights, RAINN, https://apps.rainn.org/state-laws/landing-page/ [https://perma.cc
/T5ZC-P3W6]. Although Alabama law states that TPR shall occur if a parent has
st
st
been convicted of rape in the 1 degree, sodomy in the 1 degree, or incest, it was not
included in Table A or as one of the eleven states because the statute is not specific to
terminating parental rights when the child was conceived as a result of a sexual offense. ALA. CODE § 12-15-319(b) (2012).
Moriah Silver, Legal Options for Rape Survivors to Terminate Parental Rights, 48 FAM.
L.Q. 515, 518-19 (2014).
Id. at 519.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-105.5(3) (2020). Colorado is the only state that provides
the statutory language that the conviction may be a crime in which the underlying
basis was sexual assault. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-105.7 (2020). Significantly,
Colorado also permits TPR using a clear and convincing standard. Id. § 11(a).
See Table A.
See supra Part II.
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Eighteen states permit TPR when the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the perpetrator committed a sexual offense and
214
the child was conceived as a result of the sexual offense. A majority of
the statutes in these states, however, also provide for judicial discretion
by providing that the judge “may” terminate parental rights and the person seeking termination must prove that it is in the best interest of the
215
child. As discussed above and in Part II, judicial discretion is problematic because judges commence cases with the notion that both parents are equally fit parents due to gender bias and discounting vio216
lence. In Alabama, for instance, a woman’s uncle began raping her
when she was approximately twelve years old, resulting in several chil217
dren being conceived. Despite these horrific facts, the court awarded
her uncle visitation and informed her that she would be incarcerated if
218
she denied him visitation with her children. In Pennsylvania, a court
awarded parental rights and custody of a child to the person who committed rape even though he was “on trial for his fifth Megan’s Law violation [conviction of a sex crime against a child and subsequent failure
to notify law enforcement of changes of his address and employment as
219
required by law] and living in the basement of someone’s home.” This

214. ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.180 (c)(2) (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-105.7 (2020);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-112(j)(3)(G) (2019); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1004
(2014); FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(m) (2020); HAW. REV. STATE. § 571-61(5) (2018);
IDAHO CODE § 16-2005 (b)(2)(A) (2019); IND. CODE § 31-35-3.5-7(a)(1) (2018);
IOWA CODE § 232.116(1)(p) (2014); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1402(a)(2)(ii)
(LexisNexis 2019); ME. STAT. tit. 22 § 4055(1-B) (2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 722.1445(2) (2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-15-119(1)(b) (2018); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 211.447(11) (Supp. 2019); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2511(a)(7) (2010); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 161.007(a) (West 2014); WIS. STAT. § 48.415(9) (2018). See Table B
for a condensed summary of relevant statutory language and notes for these statutes.
A more detailed version of Table B may be found at jclewisesq.wordpress.com (select
the Resource Tab and then The Stability Paradox, Table B). Other resources providing lists of state TPR statutes include Parental Rights and Sexual Assault, NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, https://www.ncsl.org/research/humanservices/parental-rights-and-sexual-assault.aspx [https://perma.cc/BP2K-YF8Q] and
Termination of Parental Rights, RAINN, https://apps.rainn.org/state-laws/landingpage/ [https://perma.cc/T5ZC-P3W6].
215. See Table B.
216. See supra Part II.
217. Alabama Court Forces Rape Survivor to Allow Rapist to Have Visitation with Children,
KNOE 8 NEWS (June 12, 2019), https://www.knoe.com/content/news/Alabamacourt-forces-rape-survivor-to-allow-rapist-to-have-visitation-with-children511195642.html [https://perma.cc/9P6M-TRHZ].
218. Id.
219. Kara Bitar, Note, The Parental Rights of Rapists, 19 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 275,
294 (2012).
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decision resulted in the minor child regressing to the point that he was
220
wearing diapers again at age five. Judicial discretion in these matters,
221
then, has often resulted in more harm to the child.
Some states have enacted additional requirements for termination
even when a clear and convincing standard is met. Indiana requires that
the petition for TPR be filed within 180 days after the birth of a child
222
when the victim of rape seeking TPR is eighteen years or older. This
is a burdensome and arbitrary time restriction when a mother is recovering from both rape and childbirth, as well as parenting a newborn. Mississippi highlights that the court may exercise its discretion not to terminate parental rights if the child’s safety and welfare are not
endangered and termination is not in the best interest of the child based
on four enumerated factors:
(a) The Department of Child Protection Services has documented compelling and extraordinary reasons why terminating the parent’s parental rights would not be in the
child’s best interests;
(b) There is a likelihood that continuing reasonable efforts for
achieving reunification will be successful;
(c) Terminating the parent’s parental rights would inappropriately relieve the parent of the parent’s financial or support
obligations to the child; or
(d) The child is being cared for by the other parent, or a relative, guardian, or custodian, in a residence not occupied by
the abusive or neglectful parent and terminating the par-

220. Id.
221. See also Bartasavich v. Mitchell, 471 A.2d 833, 834-38 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (holding that a father’s parental rights should not be terminated even when he had murdered the child’s mother, stabbed himself with a fork, was incarcerated for the crime,
and the child had had no contact with the father from ages four to twelve because doing so caused her distress).
222. IND. CODE § 31-35-3.5-4 (2018) (“[A] parent who . . . is at least eighteen (18) years
of age at the time the act of rape occurred; may not file a petition for termination of
the parent-child relationship under this chapter more than one hundred eighty (180)
days after the birth of the child.”). When a parent is under 18 at the time of the rape,
she has two years after turning 18 to file. Id.
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ent’s parental rights would not expedite the process for ob223
taining a satisfactory permanency outcome.
Factors (c) and (d) provide the courts with even more reasons to forgo
terminating the parental rights of the father. A judge may be less inclined to terminate the parental rights of the person who committed the
rape in cases where the person is capable of paying support, the mother
is on public assistance, and/or the judge believes biological parents
should not be relieved from paying support. A judge might also not
terminate the parental rights of the person who committed the sexual
assault if the child is currently residing in a safe home. In Oklahoma,
though one ground for terminating the parental rights of fathers is that
a child was conceived as a result of rape, only the district attorney or attorney for the child may file a petition or motion to terminate a parent’s
224
rights. In Louisiana, the TPR statute is found in the subchapter title
“Judicial Certification of Children for Adoption” of the Children’s
Code suggesting that there must be a contemplated adoption in order to
225
terminate parental rights. These statutory restrictions mean that, in
many cases, the mother of a child conceived as a result of rape may not
initiate a termination proceeding against the person who raped her or
may only do so in the limited context where adoption of her child by
226
another person is contemplated.
Fifteen states restrict the legal custody and/or physical custody
rights of the person who committed rape when a child was conceived as
a result of a sexual offense, but have failed to enact legislation permitting
227
TPR of the person who committed the sexual assault. The restrictions
223. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-15-123 (2018).
224. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-4-901(A) (2011).
225. See LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1015 (2014); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1004
(2014); see also State ex. rel. C.E.K., 234 So. 3d 1059, 1066 (La. Ct. App. 2017)
(emphasizing that the stated of purpose of art. 1004 is to provide for TPR to allow
adoption of the child).
226. See supra Part I.A.
227. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-416 (2017); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-121 (2015); CAL.
FAM. CODE § 3030(b) (West 2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 724A(e) (2009); 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. 46/622 (2018); KY. REV. STAT ANN. § 403.322(2) (LexisNexis
2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C, § 3 (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4.1 (West
2013); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1-c)(b) (McKinney 2010); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3109.504(A) (Lexis Nexis 2015); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (2003); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4A-20 (2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-414 (LexisNexis
2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.1 (2019); W.VA. CODE § 48-9-209a(a) (2014). See
Table C for a condensed summary of relevant statutory language and notes for these
statutes. The Stability Paradox: Table C, https://jclewisesq.com/2020/03/14/tsptable-c/ [https://perma.cc/R3TQ-WGBP]. Other resources providing lists of state
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on custody and visitation afford little protection to mothers because a
majority of the states require that the person be convicted of the sexual
228
offense in order for the statute to apply. Additionally, several of these
states permit judicial discretion in determining whether custody and vis229
itation should be awarded. Similar to the TPR statutes, affirmatively
permitting judicial discretion in determining custody in rape cases often
results in judges disregarding the violence and the impact it has on
230
mothers and children. Judges view the person who committed the
rape as fit because they either believe that the rape did not occur, or alternatively, they believe that the rape occurred but it does not affect the
child. Judges, then, can and do award custodial time to the person who
committed the rape, perpetuating the glorification of the two-parent
231
paradigm.
Of the fifteen states that restrict custodial time when conception is
due to a sexual offense, thirteen indicate that a convicted person shall not
232
be permitted custody of or visitation with the child at all. If legislators
have deemed that a person convicted of rape is unfit to have any custodial or visitation rights, then it should follow that the other parent has
the right to deny parentage or terminate the parental rights of that person. Yet, most states with these custody restrictions have not enacted
233
statutes denying parentage or permitting TPR.

228.

229.

230.
231.

232.
233.

TPR statutes include Parental Rights and Sexual Assault, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, https://perma.cc/6Z5H-5BTC and Termination of Parental
Rights, RAINN, https://perma.cc/T6SN-DM42.
Out of the states that afford restrictions on parental rights of individuals who commit
sexual assault through custody statutes alone, only two use a clear and convincing
standard: 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 46/622; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4A-20; see also
infra Table C.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C, § 3; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4.1; N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 240(1-c)(a); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16(d)(4); W.VA. CODE § 48-9-209a(a);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4A-20; VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 15, § 665(f) (2019); see also
infra Table C.
See supra Part II.
Some of these states’ statutes explicitly state that the restrictions on a father’s custodial rights are not applicable when the mother (or legal guardian) consents to the visitation. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(a)(17)(c) (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C,
§ 3(a); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-16(d)(4); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125C.210(1)
(2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-414(1)(a). Most of these statutes, however, still
provide that visitation will only be granted if it is in the best interest of the child,
suggesting that legislators do not believe that a fit parent—more specifically a woman
parent—can make sound decisions regarding her children. Id.
See Table C.
Id.
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One further point demonstrates the degree to which the legal system has resisted terminating parental rights in cases of sexual violence
against women. In cases in which the only connection between the child
and the person who committed the sexual offense is biological, there is
234
not a constitutionally protected right to parentage. As such, courts
and states should deny parentage to the rapist. Yet, only four states have
235
codified the right to do so.
TPR statutes look similarly bleak for mothers seeking legal remedies in order to protect their children in cases involving exposure to
236
IPV. TPR statutes are typically codified within adoption codes and/or
juvenile (usually dependency) codes. States vary on whether one biological parent even has standing to initiate a TPR proceeding against the
237
other. Many state statutes include abuse or neglect as an enumerated
ground for TPR, with some defining abuse as including emotional or
psychological injury or exposing minor children to an unsafe environ238
ment. To date, however, few states have actually statutorily defined

234. See Murphy, supra note 30, at 181; see also Peña v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 900 (7th
Cir. 1996) (noting that the “mere fact of fatherhood . . . that is not cemented . . . by
association with the child” does not create a constitutionally created interest).
235. See Table D. A more detailed version of Table D may be found at
jclewisesq.wordpress.com. The Stability Paradox: Table D, https://jclewisesq.com
/2020/03/14/tsp-table-d/ [https://perma.cc/3WHU-P7DW]. In all four states the
burden of proof is the clear and convincing standard.
236. See Haddix, supra note 97, at 761.
237. See supra note 6.
238. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533(B)(2) (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5105(3.1)(a)(IV) (2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(a)(5) (2009); FLA. STAT.
§ 39.806(1)(f) (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2269(b) (Supp. 2019); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 625.090(1)(a)(1) (West 2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.020(26) (West
2014); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1015(4) (2014); MINN. STAT. § 260C.301(b)(2)
(2015); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-15-119(1)(a)(i), 93-15-121(f) (2018); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 128.105(1)(b)(5) (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1111(a) (2019); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7B-101(1)(e) (2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-1-105(2) (2011 & Supp.
2020); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.504(1)(a) (2019); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-77(a)(2)(ii) (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 63-7-2570, 63-7-20(6)(a)(i) (2010); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-26.1(4) (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-113 (2017 &
Supp. 2020); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (West 2014); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 16.1-228(1) (2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-202(a)(ii)(A) (2019); see also generally State ex rel. M.R.S., No. 20020608-CA, 2003 WL 21294878 (Utah Ct. App.
Apr. 24, 2003); In re Stephen Tyler R., 584 S.E.2d 581 (W. Va. 2003). Examples of
the definition of abuse including emotional injury or exposing minor children to unsafe environments are: “Risk of serious physical, mental, or emotional injury to the
child if the child were returned to, or remains in, the home of his or her parent or
parents,” NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.105(1)(b)(5) (2018), and “harm or threatened
harm to the health, safety, or welfare of the child,” which includes mental or emotional injury. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A § 1-1-105(2) (2011 & Supp. 2020); see also The
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239

abuse as including exposure to IPV. Even where states have included
language permitting TPR on the basis of exposure to IPV, the statutory
definition of IPV is narrow compared to how IPV is experienced and
240
observed by children.
Despite most states’ failure to codify exposure to IPV as a ground
for TPR, courts have recognized that exposure to IPV is harmful to
children and, as such, can be grounds for TPR. A Kansas court, for ex241
ample, held that children exposed to IPV were emotionally abused.
Similarly, Texas courts have held that exposure to domestic violence
supports a finding of TPR due to abuse even when the abuse is “not directed at the child[]” because IPV “undermines the safety of the home
242
environment.” West Virginia courts have also highlighted that acts of
physical and emotional abuse due to IPV are relevant to TPR proceedings because children who witness IPV “may suffer deep and lasting
243
emotional harm.”

239.

240.

241.

242.

243.

Stability Paradox: Table E, https://jclewisesq.com/2020/03/14/tsp-table-e/
[https://perma.cc/X3X4-VW58].
GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-2(2)(E) (2020) (“The commission of an act of family violence as defined in Code Section 19-13-1 in the presence of the child. An act includes a
single act, multiple acts, or a continuing course of conduct. As used in this subparagraph, the term ‘presence’ means physically present or able to see or hear.”) (emphasis
added). It is unclear whether this statutory definition would encompass a child seeing
the aftermath of the violence, such as bruising to mother, but the child not having
been physically “present” during the violent act. Id.; ALASKA STAT.
§ 47.10.011(8)(B)(ii)-(iii) (2018) (including conduct by a parent which places child
at substantial risk of mental injury as a result of “exposure to conduct by a household
member . . . that is a crime [or attempted crime] under AS § 11.41.100-11.41.220,
11.41.230(a)(1) or (2), or 11.41.410-432 . . . or repeated exposure to . . . crime[s]
under AS § 11.41.230(a)(3) or AS § 11.41.250-11.41.270.”) (emphasis added).
The definition of IPV in both of these states does not include emotional abuse. GA.
CODE § 19-13-1 (2018); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.011(8)(B)(ii)-(iii). Many children,
however, observe fathers’ emotional abuse of mothers. See ALISON CUNNINGHAM &
LINDA BAKER, LITTLE EYES, LITTLE EARS: HOW VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SHAPES
CHILDREN AS THEY GROW (2007), https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/phacaspc/migration/phac-aspc/sfv-avf/sources/fem/fem-2007-lele-pypo/pdf/fem-2007lele-pypo-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/9569-WAJ2].
In re A.H., 334 P.3d 339, 343 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014) (also noting that “‘[i]f the trial
court observes abuse of one child, the judge should not be forced to refrain from taking action until the next child suffers injury.’ Young bodies cannot withstand many
savage blows; young psyches, even fewer.” (citations omitted) (quoting In re A.B.,
746 P.2d 96, 97 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987)).
In re A.M.Y., No. 04-15-00352-CV, 2015 WL 6163212, at *4 (Tex. App. Oct. 21,
2015); see also Haddix, supra note 97, at 769-70 (citing various Texas cases where
TPR of a parent was upheld when child was exposed to IPV).
In re Stephen Tyler R, 584 S.E.2d 581, 593 (W. Va. 2003) (quoting W. VA. CODE
§ 48-27-101(a)(2) (2015)); see also In re Carlita B., 408 S.E.2d 365, 368 (W. Va.
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In sum, most states have afforded limited protection and remedies
for mothers experiencing violence by failing to enact protective statutes
or enacting statutes that are ineffective. Many enacted statutes require
that the person who committed rape be convicted of the crime in order
for the court to terminate that person’s parental rights or restrict custodial time. In most rape cases, however, the rapist is not convicted of the
crime. Also, most statutes permit judicial discretion in deciding whether
to terminate parents’ rights or restrict custodial time. Judges, however,
frequently discount violence, the impact that exposure to violence has
on children, and the effect that IPV and rape have on a mother’s ability
to parent. This results in judges ordering custody arrangements that approximate the two-parent household, creating more instability in the
family because of the IPV or rape.
IV. Continued Resistance to a Paradigm Shift
In deciding whether to terminate parents’ rights, a court must balance parents’ fundamental right to parent their children with the State’s
244
parens patriae interest in protecting the welfare of children. Courts are
reluctant to terminate parental rights because TPR results in a disruption of the nuclear family paradigm. As a result, language in court opinions expresses extreme disdain for terminating parents’ rights. TPR is
245
seen as “tantamount to imposition of a civil death penalty.” Courts
also say of TPR that “few forms of state action are both so severe and so
246
irreversible;” that it is “punishment more severe than many criminal

1991) (“Prior acts of violence, physical abuse, or emotional abuse . . . are relevant in a
termination of parental rights proceeding.”); Nancy Viola R. v. Randolph W., 356
S.E.2d 464, 468 (W. Va. 1987) (“[S]pousal abuse is a factor to be considered in determining parental fitness for child custody.” (citation omitted)); Collins v. Collins, 297 S.E.2d 901, 902 (W. Va. 1982) (per curiam) (finding that the child’s mother who had committed acts of domestic violence was unfit custodian for child); In re
Wiltse, No. 318374/318375, 2014 WL 1515777, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 17,
2014) (“Moreover, it is likely the minor children would be harmed if returned to respondents’ care because of the domestic violence and unstable living environment.
Testimony during the termination hearing supported the conclusion that even if no
violence was directed at the children, the children could be ‘traumatized’ if exposed
to domestic violence.”) (citations omitted).
244. Katherine E. Wendt, Comment, How States Reward Rape: An Agenda to Protect the
Rape-Conceived Child Through the Termination of Parental Rights, 2013 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1763, 1775 (2013).
245. Drury v. Lang, 776 P.2d 843, 845 (Nev. 1989).
246. N.J. Div. of Youth Family Servs. v. P.P., 852 A.2d 1093, 1099 (N.J. 2004) (quoting
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982)).
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247

sanctions;” that “[n]o civil action carries with it graver consequences
248
than a petition to sever family ties irretrievably and forever;” and that
249
termination is a “drastic step that once taken cannot be withdrawn.”
Although courts are reluctant to terminate parents’ rights, courts
250
still acknowledge that parental rights are not absolute and that a
251
child’s interest should prevail over that of an unfit parent. Courts also
say of children’s rights that “when the interest of the child and the pa252
rental rights conflict, the interest of the child shall prevail;” “it is also
essential that emotional and physical interests of the child not be sacri253
ficed merely to preserve” the parent-child relationship; “[q]uite beyond and more important than the rights and privileges of the parents is
the welfare of these children and their prospects of becoming well254
adjusted, self-sustaining individuals;” and “parental rights will not be
enforced to the detriment or destruction of the health and well-being of
255
the child.” This language suggests that, in cases involving IPV and
rape, the child’s interest should prevail over that of the offending parent
because harm results when the court does not account for IPV and
256
rape.
In actuality, however, parents’ rights frequently prevail over children’s well-being in cases involving non-intimate partner rape and IPV.
The legal system affords limited legal protections to mothers who experience IPV or non-intimate partner rape in the TPR and custody context, which results in a denial of children’s right to proper parenting,

247. Matter of Adoption of K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d 558, 563 (N.D. 1993) (quoting Joel E.
Smith, Annotation, Right of Indigent Parent to Appoint Counsel in Proceeding for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 80 A.L.R.3d 1141, 1145 (1977), superseded
by 92 A.L.R.5th 379 (originally published in 2001)).
248. In re M.J.B, 140 S.W.3d 643, 653 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).
249. Ex Parte T.V., 971 So. 2d 1, 9 (Ala. 2007).
250. See, e.g., In re M.D.C, 39 So. 3d 1117, 1128 (Ala. 2009); N.J. Div. of Youth Family
Servs., 852 A.2d at 1099; In re Grace H., 335 P.3d 746, 756 (N.M. 2014); In re Justice A. F., No. W2011-02520-COA-R3-PT, 2012 WL 4340709, at *10 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Sept. 24, 2012).
251. Wendt, supra note 244, at 1775.
252. Charleston Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. King, 631 S.E.2d 239, 244 (S.C. 2006).
253. In re C.H., 89 S.W. 3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002).
254. Utah v. Dade, 376 P.2d 948, 949 (Utah 1962).
255. Torres v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., No. CA12-150, 2012 WL 2406614, at *4
(Ark. Ct. App. 2012); see also In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 388 (Pa. 2004) (“A parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his or her child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s right to have
proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy safe
environment.” (quoting In re B.L.L, 787 A.2d 1007, 1013 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001))).
256. See supra Part I.B.
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emotional and physical well-being, and stability. By emphasizing parental rights over the rights of the child, the legal system maintains the
structure of the nuclear family or its approximation. Judicial decisions
justify adhering to the two-parent paradigm even though it contradicts
the parens patriae interest by disregarding violence against mothers and
the impact this violence has on children. Judges are able to view the parent who is abusive as being a fit parent when, at the same time, they discredit violence against mothers and the impact that exposure to violence
has on children and mothers’ ability to parent. The parent’s rights, then,
prevail over those of the child, preserving the two-parent household or
its approximation.
A paradigm shift in the legal system is difficult because the nuclear
family paradigm is rooted in societal attitudes about family, women,
IPV, and rape. The following section will demonstrate how rooted the
two-parent paradigm is in the legal system, even in some cases where the
court decision shifts slightly from the paradigm. Current Pennsylvania
law regarding TPR and the case of M.E., a case involving rape, will be
discussed. The facts from the case of M.P. will then be used as a hypothetical TPR case to illustrate how arguments can be applied to cases involving ongoing exposure to IPV.
A. The Relationship Matters: Mere Biological Link
Versus Established Relationship
The constitutional analysis in TPR cases differs depending on what
type of relationship exists between the child and the person who committed the rape or IPV. Where the only connection between the two is
257
biological, there is no constitutionally protected right to parentage.
Conversely, where there is an established relationship between the parent and child, a fundamental liberty interest in the custody and control
258
of the child is at stake. In cases of non-intimate partner rape there is
usually only a biological connection between the person who committed
259
the crime and the child, unless the state has created a connection by
ordering visitation, custodial rights, or by requiring the offender to pay
260
child support.

257.
258.
259.
260.

Murphy, supra note 30, at 181.
See Peña v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 899-900 (7th Cir. 1996).
See Murphy, supra note 30, at 181-82.
Peña, 84 F.3d at 900 (highlighting two cases where male statutory rapists were granted parenting rights when they had been required to pay support); see also id. at 172.
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An analysis of whether a person has a constitutional right to the
care, custody, and control of their biological child matters because it can
change the outcome of TPR cases. A person who has committed rape or
IPV has this constitutional right when he has an established relationship
261
with his biological child. He therefore has the due process right to a
hearing where the grounds for terminating parental rights must be
262
proved by clear and convincing evidence. Absent clear and convincing
evidence showing that the parent is unfit, the court may not terminate a
263
parent’s rights. Courts are reluctant to terminate parental rights, espe264
cially in cases involving rape and IPV. Thus, it is much more difficult
for mothers to terminate the parental rights of the person who committed IPV or rape if that person has an established relationship with the
biological child.
Conversely, a person who has committed rape or IPV does not
have a constitutional right in the care, custody, or control of his biological child if he has not established a relationship with his biological
265
child. He therefore does not have “even minimal due process rights to
notice and hearing in family court to determine whether parentage ex266
ists.” Theoretically, then, mothers should not even need to argue for a
termination of parental rights of the person who committed the rape or
IPV, as parental rights never existed.
Actions by the State or the parties can also create parental rights in
267
cases where none previously existed. For example, statutes that permit
the termination of parental rights of a person who committed rape in
cases where the child is conceived as a result of the sexual offense create
parental rights because they assume that there are parental rights to ter268
minate. Similarly, courts may establish parental rights when ordering
269
custody or visitation rights or when requiring the payment of support.

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

See Peña, 84 F.3d at 899-900.
Santoksy v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 751, 770 (1982).
See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 751, 770.
See supra Parts I-II.
See Murphy, supra note 30, at 181.
Id.
See id. at 184, 189 n.3.
Id. at 170.
See Peña v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 901 (7th Cir. 1996). Based on the language in Peña, it can be inferred that mothers may unintentionally create parenting rights for the
person who committed rape against them if they file for child support against the offender. Id. at 901.
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B. TPR When There is Only a Biological Connection to the Child
Consider cases that have addressed the constitutionality of terminating the parental rights of a person who commits a sexual offense resulting in conception. In Peña v. Mattox, a child was conceived as a result of statutory rape and placed for adoption without the consent or
270
knowledge of the person who committed the rape. The person who
committed the sexual offense sought parental rights, asserting his rights
271
were protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. Reasoning that
“[i]t is not the brute biological fact of parentage, but the existence of an
actual or potential relationship that society recognizes as worthy of respect and protection, that activates the constitutional claim,” the Peña
court held that the person who committed the rape did not have a con272
stitutionally protected interest in his biological child. The court further found that even though it was not the person’s fault that he did not
have a relationship with the child because he had not known about the
pregnancy or adoption, he still did not have a protected right because of
273
his criminal conduct.
Notably, however, the Peña court did suggest that in some circumstances someone who commits a sexual offense may have constitutionally protected parental rights, i.e., when there is an established relationship with the child:
The maxim that a wrongdoer shall not profit from his wrong
is deeply inscribed in the Anglo-American legal tradition. It
sometimes clashes with, and is sometimes even overridden
by, competing principles. Where the wrong is of a technical,
trivial character and the cost of righting it would be great, the
maxim yields, as in cases in which a father who has established an enduring relationship with his child seeks constitutional protection for the relationship in the face of an argu274
ment that as a fornicator he should have no rights.

270.
271.
272.
273.

Peña, 84 F.3d at 895-96.
Peña, 84 F.3d at 897-98.
Peña, 84 F.3d at 899.
Peña, 84 F.3d at 900 (“[N]o court has gone so far as to hold that the mere fact of fatherhood, consequent upon a criminal act that our society does take seriously and
that is not cemented (whoever’s fault that is) by association with the child, creates an
interest that the Constitution protects in the name of liberty.”).
274. Peña, 84 F.3d at 900 (citation omitted).
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The Peña court further reasoned that individuals who commit sexual offenses “have an argument that parental duties imply correlative parental
275
rights” if child support is sought from them. Mothers seeking support,
then, can unintentionally establish parental rights for the rapist.
After Peña, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals also signaled that a
fundamental liberty interest may not be at stake when the only relation276
ship between the offender and the child is biological. In State v. Otis,
a father appealed the termination of his parental rights by challenging
the constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute that permits termination of
277
parental rights when a child is conceived as a result of a sexual assault.
The State contended that the statute was constitutional because “biological connection alone does not create a fundamental liberty interest” and
278
the father did not have a substantial relationship with his child.
Though the court analyzed the case as though the father had a fundamental liberty interest in the custody of the child, the court noted that
the statute was constitutional even if it were analyzed as if a fundamen279
tal liberty interest was not at stake. This suggests that the court may
well have agreed with the State’s contention that a fundamental liberty
interest was not at stake because there was no connection between the
father and child.
In both Peña and Otis, the two-parent paradigm arguably factored
into the courts’ determination that the State had constitutional grounds
to terminate the parental rights of the offenders. In Peña, for example,
the minor child was living in a two-parent household with individuals
who sought to adopt him prior to the person who committed the rape
280
seeking to establish his parental rights. The court specifically noted
that the person who committed the rape could not block the adoption
281
in order to create a relationship with the child. Here, allowing the offender to have parental rights would have disrupted the existing traditional two-parent family, regardless of the fact that it was created by
282
adoption.
275. Peña, 84 F.3d at 901.
276. State v. Otis G. (In re Termination of Parental Rights to Davonta S.), 2008 WI App
135, ¶ 9, 314 Wis. 2d 283, 758 N.W.2d 927 (Wis. 2008).
277. Otis G., 2008 WI App 135U, ¶¶ 3-5. Wisconsin permits TPR when a child is conceived as a result of a sexual assault when there is a “conviction or other evidence
produced at a fact-finding hearing.” WIS. STAT. § 48.415(9)(a) (2018).
278. Otis G., 2008 WI App 135U, ¶ 9.
279. See Otis G., 2008 WI App 135U, ¶ 10.
280. Peña, 84 F.3d at 900-01.
281. Peña, 84 F.3d at 901.
282. Though the facts in Otis G. do not indicate whether or not the child was going to be
adopted, there is a strong likelihood that the State was seeking TPR for adoption
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Though the Peña and Otis courts’ apparent reliance on the twoparent paradigm resulted in just outcomes—the TPR of the person who
committed the rape—more often than not, the glorification of the nuclear family perpetuates violence against women. But what results in
cases where the child has had a relationship with the person who committed the rape?
C. TPR of Offending Parent When a Relationship Exists
In In the Interest of Z.E., M.E.’s stepfather repeatedly raped her
from the time she was four years old until she was twenty-three years
283
old, resulting in three children conceived from rape. M.E. wanted to
terminate her stepfather’s parental rights to the children because, even
though he was convicted on multiple charges, incarcerated, and did not
have contact with M.E. or her children, she feared that he might try to
284
contact her and their children in the future. Unlike in Peña, however,
M.E.’s stepfather had a relationship with the children: M.E., her stepfather, and the children resided together as a family for approximately
285
four years prior to M.E. and her children leaving her stepfather.
At the time that M.E. wanted to terminate her stepfather’s parental
rights to their children, Pennsylvania’s Adoption Act which contains the
state’s TPR statute, had been interpreted to require the parent who
sought to terminate the parental rights of the other parent to have a
partner who would adopt the child and form a new parent-child rela286
tionship. M.E. did not want to have a partner adopt her children for
287
two reasons. First, M.E. believed that she should not be required to
have a partner adopt her children in order to terminate the parental
288
rights of her stepfather. As a single parent, she had created a stable,

283.
284.
285.

286.
287.
288.

purposes given the ages of the mother and the offender and the fact that the State initiated the proceedings.
In re Z.E., Nos. 3577 EDA 2018 & 3624 EDA 2018, 2019 WL 3779711 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 2019).
In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *4-5.
Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 6-7, In re Z.E., No. 3577 EDA 2018, 2019 WL
3779711 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 2019). Though the minor children had not had
any contact with the stepfather for a long time prior to the TPR proceeding and one
of the children did not even remember the stepfather, M.E. did not try to argue that
stepfather did not have any parenting rights under the theory that there was not an
existing relationship between the stepfather and the children. Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 16-26.
Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 6, 14, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711.
Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 14, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711.
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happy environment for her children where they were thriving and free
289
from harm. M.E. felt that single parents like her should not be forced
into establishing two-parent households to terminate the parental rights
290
of men who committed rape. Second, M.E. did not want a partner to
adopt her children because the person who had adopted her—her step291
father—had raped her.
M.E. challenged the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s TPR stat292
ute. When a person challenges the constitutionality of a statute, the
court reviews whether the governmental act (e.g., the statute) is law293
ful. Statutes that affect an individual’s fundamental rights, such as the
right to the care, custody, and control, of a child, are reviewed using a
294
strict scrutiny analysis. Under this review, the statute is upheld if it
serves a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to
295
serve that interest. M.E. contended that Act was unconstitutional because it did not serve a compelling state interest nor was it narrowly tai296
lored.
One purported purpose of the Act was “to dispense with the need
297
for parental consent to an adoption.” This might have served a compelling governmental interest in effectuating adoptions where a parent is
deemed unfit. Courts, however, had conflated this with establishing a
parent-child relationship with two parents in an intact marriage to pro298
tect the stability of the new family unit. This conflation was shown in
the case of In re Adoption M.R.D. where the TPR petition was denied

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

298.

Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 8, 17-18, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711.
Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 17-19, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711.
Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 6, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711.
Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 8-9, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711.
Judicial Review, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/judicial_review
[https://perma.cc/C8GK-7CFP].
Schmehl v. Wegelin, 927 A.2d 183, 185-86 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2007).
Schmehl, 927 A.2d at 185-86.
Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 15-19, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711.
See, e.g., In re Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d 1117, 1120 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016) (The
“adoption requirement is consistent with the rationale behind permitting the involuntary termination of a parent’s rights, which we have explained is ‘to dispense with
the need for parental consent to an adoption when, by choice or neglect, a parent has
failed to meet the continuing needs of the child.’” (quoting In re B.E., 377A.2d 153,
155 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977))).
See In re Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d 1117, 1127-28; see also In re Adoption of
J.D.S., 763 A.2d 867, 871 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (“Termination of the natural parent’s rights prior to adoption and allowance of stepparent adoption is for the purpose
of protecting the integrity and stability of the new family unit. Because the primary
function of government and law is to preserve and perpetuate society, the traditional
family structure is given every reasonable presumption in its favor.”).
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when the mother sought to have the minor child’s grandparent be the
299
adoptive parent. M.E. argued that establishing a two-parent household to provide stability for the family unit was not a compelling (or
300
even legitimate) state interest. M.E. noted that, in today’s society,
nontraditional families abound with 35% of children living in single
301
parent households. M.E. also argued that research studying children
who had not experienced early trauma “found no significant difference
in negative behaviors of children raised by dual parents or single par302
ents.” Two-parent households, then, do not inherently provide more
stability for children than a single-parent household.
Additionally, M.E. argued that a two-parent household did not
303
guarantee stability for a child. For example, exposure to IPV has nu304
merous adverse impacts on children. In households experiencing IPV,
the home environment or its approximate vis-à-vis shared custody ar305
rangement is harmful to mothers and children. The state’s purpose
“of creating a ‘stable, new family unit’ which preserves the nuclear family is flawed” in cases where there is IPV or rape “as the two-parent
306
household provides no such stability.”
The State’s stated objective was providing more stability to children, but by suggesting that a fit parent who was already providing a
safe, stable environment needed to have someone adopt her children in
order to terminate her attacker’s parental rights, the State undermined
307
this objective. Paradoxically, the legal system’s glorification of the
two-parent paradigm was creating more instability and harm for M.E.’s
family unit by suggesting that her stepfather could attempt future con-

299. See, e.g., In re Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d 1117 at 1120; see also supra Part I.
300. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 17, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711. In addition, a
two-parent household does not guarantee stability for a child. As discussed supra in
Part I, exposure to IPV has numerous adverse impacts on children. In households experiencing IPV, the home environment is volatile. The state’s purpose of creating a
“stable, new family unit” is fundamentally flawed as a two-parent household may
provide no such stability.
301. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 15-20, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711.
302. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 17, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711 (quoting Dominic Schmuck, Single Parenting: Fewer Negative Effects on Children’s Behaviors than
Claimed, 118 MOD. PSYCHOL. STUD. 117, 120 (2013)).
303. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 18-19, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711.
304. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 18-19, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711; see also supra
Part I.
305. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 18-19, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711; see also supra
Part I.
306. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 19, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711; see also supra Part
I.
307. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 15-19, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711.
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tact with her and her children even though his connection as a “parent”
308
was derived from his criminal acts of raping M.E.
Noting that the Act required a contemplated adoption, the trial
court denied M.E.’s petition even though it determined that grounds
for termination existed and that it would be in the best interest of the
309
minor children to terminate the parental rights of the father. The trial
court found that M.E. had not met her burden of establishing that the
statute violated the Constitution because the governmental purpose of
“effect[ing] a new family unit” was a “rational basis for the requirement
310
of adoption.” Although a fundamental right was at issue, the judge’s
language suggests that he reviewed the legitimacy of the Act under a ra311
tional basis test. Under a rational basis test, a law is upheld if it is ra312
tionally related to a legitimate government purpose. This is a much
less stringent burden for the state to meet in proving a law is constitu313
tional than application of strict scrutiny requires.
Though the court provided no further analysis in this decision, one
has to wonder whether the judge was influenced by the nuclear family
paradigm. The court emphasized that M.E. proved that grounds to terminate her stepfather’s parental rights existed, that her stepfather committed “despicable crimes of abuse” against her, and that M.E. “set forth
well-reasoned arguments to sever all connections with an abusive indi314
vidual.” Yet, the trial court still denied M.E.’s petition to terminate
her stepfather’s parental rights because there was not a contemplated
315
adoption. Unlike the positive outcome in Peña and Otis, the trial
court’s adherence to the two-parent paradigm here resulted in M.E. not
being able to terminate the parental rights of her stepfather. The different outcome in these cases may well have resulted because in Peña and
Otis the offending parents had no prior relationship with the children at
issue. In M.E.’s case, however, the parties had lived together as a family

308. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 18, In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711. In Pennsylvania,
the stated purpose of the adoption requirement was further contradicted by the statute itself. Under the statute, an unmarried person may adopt as a single person when
adopting through an agency. Id. at 19.
309. Opinion and Order at 6, In re Z.E., No. 64 O.C.A. 2018 (C.P. Monroe Cty. 2018)
(“[D]espite the despicable crimes of abuse by Father against Mother, and the facts of
this case, we are unable to grant Mother’s petition at this time.”)
310. Opinion and Order at 6, In re Z.E., No. 64 O.C.A. 2018 (C.P. Monroe Cty. 2018).
311. Opinion and Order at 6, In re Z.E., No. 64 O.C.A. 2018 (C.P. Monroe Cty. 2018).
312. Rational Basis Test, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/rational
_basis_test [https://perma.cc/CY9S-38ZT].
313. Id.
314. Opinion and Order at 6, In re Z.E., No. 64 O.C.A. 2018 (C.P. Monroe Cty. 2018).
315. Opinion and Order at 6, In re Z.E., No. 64 O.C.A. 2018 (C.P. Monroe Cty. 2018).
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unit for a period of time prior to M.E. and her children safely separating
316
from her stepfather.
On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania circumvented the
constitutional arguments raised by M.E. Instead, the court sua sponte re317
lied on a statutory section found in the Act to reverse the trial court.
Under Section 2901 of the Act, the court can determine that all of the
legal requirements of the Act, such as averring a contemplated adoption,
318
need not be met for “cause shown.” The court noted:
Applying [the] . . . contemplated adoption requirement to
the unique facts of this case creates an absurd result where
Mother, a capable and fit single parent who has been the
tragic victim of rape committed at Father’s hand for decades,
cannot remain Children’s legal Mother and seek termination
319
of Father’s, her rapist’s, parental right.
The court held that M.E. had shown cause as to why she should be re320
lieved of the contemplated adoption requirement. In distinguishing
M.E.’s case from prior decisions where the court had determined that
321
“cause shown” was not established, the court highlighted two factors.
First, there was no need to create a new parent-child relationship be322
cause M.E. was a fit parent. Second, M.E. was not attempting to
323
“subvert the adoption process in seeking” TPR of the father. Rather
M.E. was “looking to sever Father’s parental rights . . . in an effort to
put an end to the cycle of abuse, and to provide Children with a chance
to grow up in a loving, supportive and caring home with no fear of re324
prisal from Father.”
The court rejected the two-parent paradigm as it applied to M.E.’s
specific case. It did not, however, shift away from the paradigm at a
broader constitutional level. In fact, the court expressly “limit[ed] the
holding of this case to its facts so that ‘[t]he exercise of such discretion

316. In re Z.E., Nos. 3577 EDA 2018 & 3624 EDA 2018, 2019 WL 3779711, at *1 (Pa.
Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 2019).
317. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *1.
318. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2901 (2010).
319. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *6.
320. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *6.
321. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *7.
322. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *7.
323. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *7.
324. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *7.
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does not open the door’ to terminat[ion of] parental rights ‘when adop325
tion is not contemplated.’”
At the same time, the court repeatedly signaled that the legal system should shift away from the nuclear family paradigm. The court noted the law should be changed because an absurd result occurs when the
State requires a fit parent to have a contemplated adoption in order to
326
terminate the parental rights of the man who raped her. The opinion
also highlighted that “societal norms regarding what constitutes a family
are constantly evolving” and that M.E., a single parent, was capable of
327
raising her children in a supportive, caring home. All of these statements signal that a paradigm shift should occur to recognize that twoparent households or its approximation are not always the more stable
family units—particularly where sexual violence has occurred—because
it is harmful to both mothers and children.
State statutes requiring a conviction to terminate parental rights in
cases where a child is conceived as a result of the sexual offense could also be challenged using the analysis in Peña and Otis. As signaled in Peña
and Otis, a fundamental liberty interest is not at stake when there is no
relationship between the offending parent and the child other than biol328
ogy. A person who committed rape does not even have a constitutionally protected right to parent if he does not have a relationship with the
329
child. Any statute that creates this right could be challenged as unconstitutional from the onset. The advantage to this argument is that it
eliminates judicial discretion: Since parentage is denied from the onset,
judges would not have the opportunity to determine whether TPR is in
the best interest of the child. This would prevent judges from upholding
the two-parent paradigm and denying TPR of the offending parents.
The dicta in In the Interest of Z.E. could be used to challenge state
statutes requiring a conviction to terminate parental rights in cases
where a child is conceived as a result of the sexual offense—whether
there is a relationship between the offending child or not. For most
states, the stated purpose of TPR statutes is to protect the child from an

325. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *8 (quoting In re Adoption of R.B.F., 569 Pa. 269,
280 (Super. Ct. 2002)).
326. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *6 (“It is doubtful that the legislature would have
intended such a result where a fit parent seeks to ensure his or her family’s safety and
prevent them ‘from further exposure to a sexually violent predator.’”).
327. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *8.
328. Peña v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 899-901 (7th Cir. 1996); see State v. Otis G. (In re
Termination of Parental Rights to Davonta S.), 2008 WI App 135, ¶ 10, 314 Wis.
2d 283, 758 N.W.2d 927 (Wis. 2008).
329. See Peña, 84 F.3d at 899-901.
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unfit parent (i.e., from harm, such as abuse and neglect) and promote
330
permanency and stability for the child. A conviction requirement renders the state’s purported objective of protecting children from harm
and providing stability and permanency in the family unit moot because
few mothers will be able to access the legal protections afforded by the
TPR statute.
Continued contact with an offending parent has harmful effects on
331
mothers and children. Legislatures have recognized this harm. In Colorado, the preamble to the statute permitting TPR when a child is conceived as a result of a sexual offense notes that the purpose of the statute
is to “protect the victim of the sexual assault and to the protect the
332
child . . . by . . . preventing future contact between the parties.” The
United States House of Representatives has noted that continued contact with a rapist can have “traumatic psychological effects on the survivor” which can “severely negatively impact her ability to raise a healthy
333
child.” Despite legislatures recognizing that contact between a mother
and the person who raped her creates instability in the family unit and
334
harm to the child, the conviction requirement persists in many states.
Paradoxically, this requirement contravenes the stated purposes of promoting permanency for children and protecting them from an unfit
335
parent because most offenders are not convicted of rape. In In the Interest of Z.E., the court noted that the adoption requirement created an
“absurd result” because the mother, “a capable and fit single parent who
had been the tragic victim of rape,” could not terminate the parental
336
rights of the person who raped her. The conviction requirement creates a similar absurd result: Most fit mothers who have experienced sexual assault will not be able to terminate the parental rights of the person
who raped them because of low conviction rates in sexual assault cases.
Notably, state statutes do not require a conviction to terminate a
parent’s right for most other grounds permitting TPR, such as abuse,
337
neglect, substance abuse dependency, and abandonment. Why, then,
330. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-100.2 (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2201
(Supp. 2019); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-201 (2019).
331. See supra Part I.B.
332. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-105.5(1) (2020).
333. Rape Survivor Child Custody Act, H.R. 1257, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015).
334. See supra Part III.
335. See supra Part III.
336. In re Z.E., Nos. 3577 EDA 2018 & 3624 EDA 2018, 2019 WL 3779711, at *6 (Pa.
Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 2019).
337. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.011 (2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-112(j) (2019);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292.02 (2019); NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.105(b) (2018); N.H.
REV. STAT. § 170-C:5 (Supp. 2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1111(a) (2019); N.D.
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do many states require a conviction for rape as a prerequisite to terminating the parental rights of the person who committed the rape when a
child is conceived as a result of the sexual offense? A conviction requirement is further evidence of how the legal system disbelieves women
and discounts allegations of rape.
D. TPR When There is Exposure to IPV
In cases involving IPV, a fundamental liberty interest will usually
be at stake because the father is likely to have an established relationship
with the child. The State, however, has a compelling government interest—protecting a child from the psychological and physical harm—in
the TPR of a parent who exposes a child to his ongoing abusive and
338
controlling behavior. The absence of statutes permitting TPR on the
basis of children’s exposure to IPV—even though a number of statutes
recognize that emotional and psychological abuse injures children—
further reflects societal belief that permitting TPR in these circumstances will cause the family unit to disintegrate.
Although the holding in In the Interest of Z.E. was limited to the
facts of that case, the Superior Court’s reasoning can be used to support
the termination of a father’s rights in cases where a relationship exists
between the father and the child and the child was or is exposed to IPV.
In M.P. v. M.P., though M.P. never sought to terminate the parental
rights of her husband, the facts in her case are useful to demonstrate
how one could argue for terminating the parental rights of a partner
339
340
who is abusive. M.P. fled the marital residence due to IPV; M.P.’s
husband engaged in a pattern of physical, psychological, and emotional
341
abuse including controlling her finances and threatening her. Examples of the IPV include when M.P.’s husband kicked her in the back

338.

339.

340.
341.

CENT. CODE § 27-20-44(1) (2016); S.C. CODE. ANN. § 63-7-2570 (2010); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 14-2-309 (2019).
See supra Part I.B; see also In re A.H., 334 P.3d 339, 343 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014); In re
A.M.Y., No. 04-15-00352-CV, 2015 WL 6163212, at *4 (Tex. App. Oct. 21, 2015);
In re Stephen Tyler R., 584 S.E.2d 581, 593 (W. Va. 2003); Nancy Viola R. v. Randolph W., 356 S.E.2d 464, 468 (W. Va. 1987); Collins v. Collins, 297 S.E.2d 901,
902 (W. Va. 1982); In re Wiltse, No. 318374/318375, 2014 WL 1515777, at *3
(Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2014).
M.P. v. M.P., 54 A.3d 950, 951 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). The Barbara J. Hart Justice
Center (a project of the Women’s Resource Center) represented M.P. on numerous
family matters. M.P. provided consent for her case to be shared.
M.P., 54 A.3d at 951.
Interview with M.P., client, in Scranton, Pa. (2011).
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342

and threw her against a counter while she was holding their daughter.
He also threatened to beat her when she insisted they go to the doctor
because the baby was sick, threatened that she would never see their
daughter again if she left him, and controlled her access to money to the
343
point where she was not even allowed to purchase her own clothing.
After M.P. left her husband, he had no contact with their daughter by
344
his own choice and he did not pay any child support.
The right to terminate parental rights based solely on ongoing ex345
posure to IPV does not exist under Pennsylvania law. Hypothetically
M.P. could have sought to terminate his rights under two enumerated
grounds in the statute:
1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least
six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform
parental duties.
2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or
refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
346
will not be remedied by the parent.
Pennsylvania law, however, required that M.P. also show that either she
had someone who will adopt her daughter, creating a new family unit,
or that the legal requirement of adoption need not be met based on the
347
facts of her case.
Under the decision in In the Interest of Z.E., M.P. could argue that
the facts of her case are such that the legal requirement that a contemplated adoption be averred are not necessary. M.P. suffered extreme
abuse by her husband and since 2011 she has been the sole financial

342. Id.
343. Id.; see also Petition for Protection from Abuse at 8, Piguave v. Price, No. 2009-FC40747 (Lackawanna Cty. Ct. Com. Pl. June 22, 2009).
344. Interview with M.P., client, in Scranton, Pa. (2011); see also Guardian Ad Litem Report & Recommendation at 1, Piguave v. Price, No. 2009-FC-40747 (Lackawanna
Cty. Ct. Com. Pl. Aug. 30, 2011); M.P., 54 A.3d at 951-52.
345. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2511(a) (2010).
346. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2511(a)(1)-(2) (2010).
347. See supra Part I.A for a detailed analysis of the relevant Pennsylvania laws.

376

michigan journal of gender

& law

[Vol. 27:311

provider for her daughter and had primary physical and sole legal custo348
dy. Further, the father has not seen or contacted their child since
349
2011. In In the Interest of Z.E., the Superior Court noted these same
facts: That M.E. had been the sole financial provider, had primary custody and legal custody of the children, had suffered abuse by father, and
350
that the father had had no contact with the children.
In addition, M.P., like M.E., is a fit parent who has met her
daughter’s needs, demonstrating that there is no need to establish a new
parent-child relationship. M.P. would not be acting to “subvert” the
adoption process as she is not seeking to terminate the parental rights of
351
the father for being “ineffective or merely negligent.” Rather, she seeks
to terminate the parental rights of the father “in an effort to end a cycle
of abuse” and to provide her daughter “with a chance to grow up in a
loving, supportive and caring home with no reprisal from [the]
352
[f]ather.” The requirement of a contemplated adoption would once
again be counterproductive to the State’s objective of family stability.
In sum, M.P. has the same arguments advanced by M.E. M.P.
need not have a contemplated adoption in order to terminate the parental rights of her daughter’s father because she is a fit parent and the father is not. M.P., like M.E., would also be seeking to end a cycle of violence to prevent future harm to her daughter. In addition, M.P. has the
same constitutional arguments that M.E. raised. States do not have a
compelling reason for requiring contemplated adoptions when a fit parent seeks to terminate the parental rights of the other parent who is unfit. Conversely, States do have a compelling reason to terminate the
rights of a parent who exposes a minor child to his ongoing physical,
psychological, sexual, and/or financial abuse because extensive research
has demonstrated the harmful impact exposure to IPV has on children.
Although the case of In the Interest of Z.E. is limited to Pennsylvania, the Superior Court’s opinion and the mother’s brief provide persuasive arguments for the legal system to move away from the nuclear family paradigm. In In the Interest of Z.E., the court recognized the stability
paradox that results when the court adheres to the traditional family (or

348. Interview with M.P., client, in Scranton, Pa. (2011); see also Stipulated Order at 1,
Piguave v. Price, No. 2009-FC-40747 ((Lackawanna Cty. Ct. Com. Pl. Oct. 31,
2011); Stipulated Order at 1, Piguave v. Price, N0.2009-FC-40747 (Lackawanna
Cty. Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 7, 2011).
349. Interview with M.P., client, in Scranton, Pa. (2011).
350. In re Z.E., No. 3577 EDA 2018 & 3624 EDA 2018, 2019 WL 3779711, at *2, *7
(Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 2019).
351. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *7.
352. In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *7.
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its approximation) when it noted that there is no need to create a new
parent-child relationship because the mother was a fit parent and stepfather was not. The language used for the mother and for the stepfather in
the opinion also simultaneously framed the case, addressing the notion
of parental equality. Within the opinion, the mother is referred to as the
353
“fit parent” whereas the stepfather is the “rapist.” In other words, the
stepfather, by nature of his criminal conduct of violence towards the
mother, is unfit.
The court, then, did not need to adhere to the judicial notions of
parental equality because the mother and the stepfather are not on equal
footing. Rather, the stepfather’s egregious and criminal conduct made
him an unfit parent. Finally, the court not only credited the violence
against the mother, but also the harmful impact that future exposure to
the stepfather could have on both the mother and the children. Here,
the court dismantled the presumptions of parental equality, discounting
violence against mothers, and gender bias, thereby signaling a limited
(due to the narrow holding of the case) paradigm shift away from the
two-parent household. Until the legal system shifts fully from the twoparent paradigm and addresses the factors that perpetuate it and violence against women, an absence of TPR statutes could result in courts
continuing to award custodial time and visitation to persons who commit sexual offenses and/or IPV. The next section discusses the advantages and disadvantages of enacting TPR statutes directed at cases
involving rape or IPV and provides model legislation.
V. Model Legislation
The goal of enacting statutes permitting TPR and/or restricting visitation in cases where a child was conceived as a result of a sexual offense
should be to afford protections for mothers and children. But when
lawmakers start with the presumption that parental rights exist, the statutes they enact can have the harmful consequence of making it more
difficult to terminate the parental rights or restrict visitation of violent
354
offenders or abusive partners. Statutes that begin with the presumption that a person who has committed the sexual offense has parenting
rights have the effect of putting the mother and the person who com355
mitted the rape on equal footing when they enter the courtroom.

353. See In re Z.E., 2019 WL 3779711, at *6-7.
354. See generally Murphy, supra note 30.
355. Id. at 182-83.
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Thus, the notion that parental rights already exist provides a legal advantage to the person who committed the violent offense.
In the absence of TPR statutes, courts award custodial rights to
men who have committed rape. This has often meant long, arduous legal battles for mothers. TPR statutes, then, became a necessary tool in
efforts to prevent men who committed rape from obtaining parenting
rights even though many provide inadequate protection for mothers because the statutes either require a criminal conviction or permit judicial
discretion in determining whether the parental rights will be terminat356
ed. And because TPR statutes themselves reinforce the faulty notion
that a parent-child relationship exists in cases when it does not—
specifically where a child is conceived as a result of a sexual offense—
continuing to propose legislation and/or seeking amendments to existing statutes is admittedly risky. Numerous statutes, however, have already been enacted and a lack of statutes continues to result in courts
awarding custody to the offending person without remedies for moth357
ers. Amending existing statutes or enacting statutes in states that have
not done so, then, can improve protections for mothers and their children.
This section provides recommendations for model legislation on
TPR for cases involving rape and IPV. Relevant portions of existing
358
state statutes, prior proposed ideas expressed in articles, and ideas
based on practical experience are used to formulate more comprehensive
legislation. The model legislation denies parental rights from the onset if
the person who committed the rape or IPV does not have an established
relationship with the child. This legislation lessens presumptions of parental equality and combats the discounting of violence against women
356. See supra Part III.
357. See, e.g., Amanda Woods, Convicted Rapist Gets Joint Custody of Victim’s Child, N.Y.
POST (Oct. 9, 2017), https://nypost.com/2017/10/09/convicted-rapist-gets-jointcustody-of-victims-child/ [https://perma.cc/X4MT-YKKR]; Alabama Court Forces
Rape Survivor to Allow Rapists to Have Visitation with Children, KNOE 8 NEWS (June
12, 2019), https://www.knoe.com/content/news/Alabama-court-forces-rape-survivorto-allow-rapist-to-have-visitation-with-children-511195642.html [https://perma.cc
/JF4Y-NYH6]; Lynn Smith, Some States Are Giving Rapists Custody of Children, and
That Needs to Stop, PARENTS (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.parents.com/parenting
/better-parenting/some-states-are-giving-rapists-custody-of-children-and-that-needsto-stop/ [https://perma.cc/24PF-BWED].
358. See, e.g., Bitar, supra note 219; Haddix, supra note 97; Natalie Hoch, The Real American Horror Story: Overcoming the Hurdles to Terminate a Rapist’s Parental Rights, 51
VAL. U.L. REV. 783 (2017); Johnson, supra note 98; Rachael Kessler, Due Process and
Legislation Designed to Restrict the Rights of Rapist Fathers, 10 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y
199, 221-28 (2015); Prewitt, supra note 29; Silver, supra note 209; Wendt, supra
note 244.
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and gender by limiting judicial discretion and not requiring a conviction
in order to terminate parental rights. The proposed legislation seeks to
dismantle the two-parent paradigm by addressing these presumptions.
The model legislation involves three sections. States should enact
all three sections in order to most effectively prevent instability in the
family unit. Section A addresses cases where the person who committed
rape or IPV does not have an established relationship with the child.
Here, the person who committed the rape or IPV is prohibited from
even establishing parentage. In other words, the person is prohibited
from even claiming they are legally the child’s parent. Section B addresses cases where the person committed rape, the child was conceived
as a result of the sexual offense, and there is a relationship between the
offender and the child. Section C addresses cases where a person has exposed a child to ongoing IPV and there is an established relationship between the offending parent and the child.
A. Denial of Parentage
In cases where a relationship with the child has not formed, the offender should be precluded from even establishing parentage. Georgia,
Michigan, Vermont, and Washington have enacted statutes that prohibit parentage from being established or maintained in cases where a child
359
is conceived as a result of rape. All four states require proof by a clear
and convincing standard that the person committed a sexual assault
360
which resulted in conception of the child. States should enact statutes
361
similar to these.
The Georgia, Michigan, Vermont, and Washington statutes deny362
ing parentage only address cases involving rape. In most cases involving IPV, the offending parent will have an established relationship with
the child. There may be some limited cases involving IPV where the offending parent does not have an established relationship with the minor
child. States, therefore, should expand the language in these statutes to
include IPV.
Statutes that deny parentage when the offending parent has not established a relationship with the child help prevent the creation of parenting rights when none should exist. They also permit less judicial dis-

359.
360.
361.
362.

See Table D.
See Table D.
See Table D.
See Table D.
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cretion. Judges need not place the parents on equal footing when they
enter the courtroom because judges are only determining whether the
child was conceived as a result of rape. Unfortunately, judicial discounting of allegations of rape and IPV as well as judicial gender bias may still
occur when there is not a conviction for the rape, even when one is not
required, because judges are still assessing whether the mother’s allegations are credible. Overall, however, denial of parentage statutes provide
judges with less discretion by limiting the issue before the judge. Additionally, the statutes dismantle the two-parent paradigm by expressly
stating that parentage can be denied and, thus, affirming that a singleparent household provides stability for a child.
B. TPR in Cases Involving Rape and Established Relationship with
the Child
The following model legislation is proposed for cases where the offender committed rape, the child was conceived as a result of the sexual
offense, and the offender has an established relationship with the child:
(a) The court shall terminate the parental rights upon a finding of one or more of the following:
1) The person was convicted, or pled guilty or nolo contendere, to a sexual offense against the petitioner or was convicted, or pled guilty or nolo contendere, to an offense in
which the underlying factual basis was a sexual offense
against the petitioner, in this state or another state, territory, possession, or jurisdiction, and a child was conceived as the result of the sexual offense.
Termination of the parental relationship must also be in
the best interest of the child. There is a rebuttable presumption that terminating the parental rights of the parent who committed the act of sexual violence is in the
best interest of the child. The court shall not presume
that having only one remaining parent is contrary to the
best interest of the child; or
2) The court finds by clear and convincing evidence, after
trial, that
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i) The alleged perpetrator committed a sexual offense;

363

ii) The child was conceived as a result of that sexual offense;
and
iii) Termination is in the best interest of the child. There is a
rebuttable presumption that terminating the parental
rights of the parent who committed the act of sexual violence is in the best interest of the child. The court shall
not presume that having only one remaining parent is
contrary to the best interest of the child.
(b) Other considerations:
1) In determining whether the termination of parental rights
is in the best interest of the child, the court shall presume
that continued contact with the person who committed
the sexual offense has psychological effects on the victim
364
negatively impacting her ability to raise the child.
2) The parent who is the victim of a sexual offense may file a
petition for termination of parental rights. The victim of
the sexual offense may file the petition without an averment that there is an adoption, need not relinquish her
parental rights, and need not have a prospective adoptive
second parent for the child.
3) A petition for termination of parental rights under this
section may be filed at any time.
4) Terminating the parental rights of a parent does not relieve that parent of his or her support obligation. The
parent whose parental rights are not being terminated has
the right to waive said support. No state agency may re-

363. The statute could specifically define sexual offense by enumerating crimes that constitute any offense where a child could be conceived as a result of the conduct. For instance, in Pennsylvania, the statute could read: For purposes of this section “sexual
offense” has the same meaning as in 18 Pennsylvania Statute Sections 3121-3126, or
Section 4302 or pursuant to comparable law of another state, territory, possession, or
jurisdiction or where the offense occurred. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3121, 3122.1,
3123, 3124.1, 3124.2, 3124.3, 3125-26, 4302 (2015).
364. See Rape Survivor Child Custody Act, H.R. 1257, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015).
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quire the parent whose rights are not being terminated to
seek support as a condition of receiving public benefits.
Numerous existing statutes are inadequate because they fail to provide that a guilty plea or nolo contendere plea would provide grounds
365
for TPR, often leaving mothers without legal protection because in
the majority of situations few convictions result from sexual assault alle366
gations. Most statutes also fail to state that a conviction, guilty plea,
or nolo contendere plea to an offense in which the underlying basis was
367
a sexual offense permits TPR. Given that many prosecuted cases result
368
in pleas to lessor offenses, inclusion of this language (and language
that a conviction, guilty plea, or nolo contendere plea in this state or
other states) broadens the applicability of the statute in cases where a
child was conceived as a result of a sexual offense. Most importantly,
this proposed statute provides that TPR can occur in cases where there
is a conviction for a sexual offense or where clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that a child was conceived as a result of a sexual offense. It is imperative that states permit the ability to terminate the parental rights of a parent who is a sexual offender absent a conviction
369
because few convictions occur in sexual assault cases. Statutory language that explicitly permits TPR in cases of conviction for rape or an
underlying offense, or where clear and convincing evidence show that a
child was conceived as a result of a sexual offense improves access to legal recourse for mothers.
Notably, the model statute states that the court “shall” rather than
“may” terminate parental rights to prevent judicial discretion, which is
often used to further the two-parent paradigm regardless of the effect on
families. Some judicial discretion remains in the proposed statute because the court must still determine that terminating parental rights is in
the best interest of the child. A rebuttable presumption that terminating
the rights of the parent who committed a sexual offense is in the best interest of the child is included in the model legislation to limit judicial
discretion in the best interest of the child determination. Any form of
judicial discretion is not ideal given courts’ resistance to shift from the

365.
366.
367.
368.

See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.
Erica Goode, Stronger Hand for Judges in the ‘Bazaar’ of Plea Deals, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
22, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/stronger-hand-for-judges-afterrulings-on-plea-deals.html [https://perma.cc/56QN-659W] (“97 percent of federal
cases and 94 percent of state cases end in plea bargains”).
369. See supra Part III.
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nuclear family paradigm and to afford weight and credibility to accounts
of rape. The best interest of the child analysis, however, is included here
for two reasons. First, the proposed legislation might be unconstitutional without the best interest of the child analysis because the fundamental
right to the custody of one’s child is at stake. Second, legislators may be
reluctant to enact statutes without inclusion of a best interest determination because states have generally included this analysis in both custody
370
and TPR determinations. Though not ideal, the rebuttable presumption at least provides mothers with better protection (and arguments
should she have to appeal the case) than a best interest analysis absent a
statutory presumption.
The model legislation also includes language that the court must
presume that contact with the person who committed the rape will negatively impact the mother’s ability to parent. In determining the best interest of the child, courts frequently fail to consider or understand how
trauma impacts parenting. Rather, courts tend to focus on whether the
child was directly physically or emotionally harmed by the offending
371
parent when engaging in best interest of the child analysis. However,
continued interaction with the person who committed the rape may retraumatize the mother, impacting her ability to parent through no fault
372
of her own. This, in turn, does impact the child. Including this language helps prevent courts from discounting the effect of violence on
families and limits courts’ ability to revert to the two-parent paradigm.
The proposed statute also expressly allows the victim to file a petition without having to contemplate adoption. This provision emphasizes that mothers in this position still have standing to file. The provision
stating that the petition may be filed at any time was added to counter
state statutes that restrict the time period for when a petition may be
filed. A woman undergoing the trauma of rape recovery and birth of a
child should have the time and control to file a petition when she so desires instead of her being restricted to arbitrary filing deadlines that serve
373
no purpose.

370. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.19b(5) (2013); MINN. STAT. § 260C.301
Subd. 7 (2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A § 1-4-904(A)(2) (2011); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 2511(b) (2010); KY. REV. STAT. § 625.090(1)(C) (West 2014).
371. See BARRY GOLDSTEIN & ELIZABETH LIU, REPRESENTING THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
SURVIVOR, 5-8 (Civ. Res. Inst., 2d ed. 2019). Courts also penalize mothers who do
not present well in court due to the trauma and/or have taken measures to protect
themselves and their children from repeated interactions and exposure to the person
who raped them. Meier, supra note 15, at 690-93.
372. See supra Part I.B.
373. See supra Part III.
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Finally, the statute includes a provision that TPR does not relieve
the parent whose rights are being terminated of his obligation to pay
child support. This provision was added because rape and IPV has a sig374
nificant negative short- and long-term financial impact on survivors.
Recognizing that any support payments would be a constant reminder
of the person who committed the rape or IPV, the model legislation
provides that the victim may waive support if she so chooses. To prevent
the legal system from forcing a rape survivor to have constant contact
with the person who raped her in order to acquire necessary benefits for
family stability, the statute also prevents agencies from forcing a victim
to file for support as a condition of receiving public benefits.
C. TPR in IPV Cases
In cases where children are exposed to ongoing IPV, the following
legislation is proposed:
(a) The court shall terminate parental rights when: The
court finds by clear and convincing evidence, after trial,
the repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or
refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions
and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal
cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
1) “Continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal” includes exposing the minor child(ren) to a history of ongoing domestic violence which includes physical and sexual violence, intimidation, threats, psychological
/emotional abuse, financial abuse, using the minor child

374. See Sara J. Shoener & Erika A. Sussman, Economic Ripple Effect of IPV: Building
Partnerships for Systemic Change, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REP., 83, 83-84 (Aug.-Sept.
2013). Research has shown that 99% of survivors experience economic abuse during
the relationship. Id. at 83. Economic abuse includes preventing resource acquisition
(i.e., preventing a partner from working, acquiring asset ownership, interfering with
employment opportunities), preventing resource use (i.e., denying access to money,
disabling the person’s vehicle), and resource exploitation (i.e., taking out credit cards
in partner’s name, deliberately failing to pay bills in partner’s name). Id. “Long after
the occurrence of an incident of abuse, survivors experience significant obstacles” to
obtaining economic security due to “the interpersonal, physical, and psychological effects of the violence.” Id.
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to gain contact or information about the non-offending
parent, and litigation abuse.
2) Exposure includes, but is not limited to, directly observing the violence, hearing the parent being abused screaming for help or crying; observing the aftermath of abuse
such as injuries, torn clothing, broken or damaged items
such as furniture and telephones; hearing the abusive
parent degrade, belittle and/or threaten the other parent;
and the abusive parent interrogating the child about the
other parent.
3) Exposure to domestic violence may occur during the parent’s relationship and/or after the parents have separated.
(b) Other considerations:
1) Termination of the parental relationship must be in the
best interest of the child. There is a rebuttable presumption that exposing a child to ongoing IPV is not in the
child’s best interest. The court shall not presume that
having only one remaining parent is contrary to the best
interest of the child.
2) In determining whether TPR is in the best interest of the
child, the court shall presume that continued contact
with the person who is committing IPV may have psychological effects on the non-abusing parent, negatively
impacting the parent’s ability to raise the child.
3) The parent who is the victim of the IPV may file a petition for termination of parental rights. A victim of IPV
may file the petition without an averment that there is an
adoption; the filing parent need not relinquish their parental rights and need not have an adoptive parent for the
child.
4) The parental rights of the parent who is being
abused/victimized shall not be terminated under this section.
5) Parents responding or reacting to violence of another
parent in an effort to protect themselves or a child against

385
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that violence does not constitute grounds to terminate
parental rights under this section.
6) A petition to terminate parental rights under this section
may be filed at any time.
7) Terminating the parental rights of a parent does not relieve that parent of their support obligation. The parent
whose parental rights are not being terminating has the
right to waive said support. No state agency may require
the parent whose rights are not being terminated to seek
support as a condition of receiving public benefits.
The model legislation provides that a ground for TPR is ongoing exposure to IPV because few states have explicitly included exposure to IPV
as a statutory ground to terminate parental rights, leaving mothers with
limited legal recourse. Given that many judges conclude that IPV does
375
not harm children once the parties separate, the proposed statute also
states that the exposure to IPV may occur during and after parties have
separated. Absent from the model legislation is the requirement that
there must be observable impairment in the child’s ability to function or
that the child is exhibiting symptoms of emotional or psychological
damage, such as anxiety, withdrawal, or aggressive behaviors. Though
this might seem counterintuitive, while exposure to IPV does harm
children, the impact IPV has on a child might not be apparent until
376
months or years later. This language, then, is not included in the statute because the negative impact that exposure to IPV has on children
377
may not be observable to the judge at the time of the hearing. This
provision acknowledges that IPV harms children, helping to dismantle
the nuclear family paradigm.

375. This is based on observations of judges’ decisions in custody cases involving IPV in
Pennsylvania. See also DANIEL G. SAUNDERS, KATHLEEN C. FALLER & RICHARD M.
TOLLMAN, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS ABOUT
DOMESTIC ABUSE ALLEGATIONS: THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO EVALUATOR
DEMOGRAPHICS, BACKGROUND, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE KNOWLEDGE, AND
CUSTODY-VISITATION RECOMMENDATIONS (Oct. 31, 2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov
/pdffiles1/nij/grants/238891.pdf [https://perma.cc/KT2Y-AW6A] (finding that judges had less knowledge about separation violence than other domestic violence topics).
376. See supra Part I.B.
377. See supra Part I.B.
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Provisions (2), (3), (4), (7), and (8) are the same as those found in
the proposed legislation for cases involving rape when there is a relation378
ship with the child and are necessary here for the same reasons.
There is always the fear that someone who is abusive and controlling may attempt to use any statute, no matter how carefully crafted, to
further terrorize their victim by seeking to terminate her parental rights.
As an example, it is not uncommon for a father who has engaged in a
pattern of abuse to contact law enforcement about the non-offending
mother as another form of abuse. Should law enforcement believe the
father’s allegations that the mother assaulted him, the mother may be
arrested, charged, and convicted of assault even when she was acting in
self-defense. This, in turn, could provide the father with grounds to
terminate the mother’s rights, alleging that she exposed the child to
IPV. In an attempt to curtail this behavior, the model statute includes
language stating that a victim’s parental rights shall not be terminated.
Language was also incorporated to ensure that reacting or responding to
the violence to protect oneself is not grounds for TPR because many
379
women do react to the violence at some point in time.
Mothers still encounter arduous battles in the legal system, even
with statutory reform intended to correct judges’ presumptions that
cause negative outcomes for mothers and children. This legal battle will
continue until there is a shift away from the two-parent paradigm.
Conclusion
In a recent Pennsylvania case, a mother appealed a custody decision
380
that awarded the father of her child primary custody. Prior to the father obtaining primary custody, the mother had been the child’s prima381
ry caretaker since birth. The father, however, filed for primary custody
382
after the mother’s new boyfriend assaulted the mother. Even though
the mother testified at trial that she had separated from this boyfriend,
the trial court determined that there was “uncertainty surrounding that
status” because the mother was in contact with the boyfriend’s mother
383
and used the boyfriend’s vehicle while he was incarcerated. The trial

378. For discussion as to why these provisions are necessary, see supra Part IV.B.
379. Swan, supra note 173, at 1027-29.
380. B.S. v. D.M.S., No. 1340 WDA 2018, 2019 WL 2453865, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jun.
11, 2019).
381. B.S., 2019 WL 2453865, at *1-2.
382. B.S., 2019 WL 2453865, at *2.
383. B.S., 2019 WL 2453865, at *3.
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court also referenced more than once that the “[f]ather’s home includes
a positive female role model, while [m]other’s home currently does not
384
include a positive male role model.” On appeal, the mother contended that the trial court awarded primary custody to the father because it
385
incorrectly determined that the minor child needed a father figure.
386
The Superior Court affirmed the trial court decision, finding that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the father primary
387
custody based on the absence of a father figure in mother’s household.
Gender bias and the court’s adherence to the two-parent paradigm
influenced the decision in this case, heightening the father’s parental
rights even though he had relocated out-of-state and the mother had
been the child’s primary caretaker since birth. The trial court discounted
the mother’s testimony that she had separated from her abusive boyfriend, even though there was an absence of testimony that she had been
388
in contact with him. That the trial court discounted the testimony of
the mother, a woman litigant, and the Superior Court affirmed the trial
court’s holding suggests that the nuclear family paradigm influenced
both courts deciding this case.
The above case highlights how entrenched the nuclear family paradigm continues to be in the legal system. In cases where a child is conceived as a result of a sexual offense or a child is exposed to ongoing
IPV, a paradigm shift away from the nuclear family is necessary to protect both mothers and children from continued risk of harm. Until,
however, a broader attitudinal transformation occurs in society—where
women’s allegations of rape and IPV are believed, and gender bias in
courts ends, resulting in judges recognizing that a “parental equality”
presumption is not in the best interest of the child in cases involving
rape and IPV—courts will adhere to the nuclear family paradigm.
Enacting TPR statutes to address cases where a child is conceived
as a result of a sexual offense or the child is exposed to ongoing IPV may
lead to some unintended consequences. But not doing so preserves unacceptable barriers to justice and safety for mothers. Existing statutes are
too limited in scope to address issues such as conviction requirements
and judicial discretion. Statutes should be enacted and existing statutes
should be amended to afford comprehensive and attainable protections
for mothers and children.
384. B.S., 2019 WL 2453865, at *4, *16.
385. B.S., 2019 WL 2453865, at *1. The father was living with his girlfriend whereas the
mother had recently separated from her boyfriend. Id. at *4.
386. B.S., 2019 WL 2453865, at *16.
387. B.S., 2019 WL 2453865, at *16-17.
388. B.S., 2019 WL 2453865, at *3.
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389

The law does not permit a person who has committed a criminal
389
act to reap the benefits of his crime. A person who robs a bank forfeits
his right to the money taken. And yet an offender who commits a violent crime and conceives a child or continues to commit violence against
the mother of his children and his family is afforded protections by the
legal system. Limited protections for mothers in the legal system persist
because the two-parent paradigm is entrenched in the legal system. This,
in turn, creates the stability paradox as forced contact with the offending
parent creates more instability in the family unit and results in harm to
the child. Thus, the ramification of not trying to shift this entrenched
paradigm is to perpetuate violence against women and children. In order to ensure that children’s best interests are truly the driving force in
the family court system, society and our legal system must address presumptions of parental equality, the discounting of violence against
women, and gender bias. Only then can the stability paradox end.

389. See Peña v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 901 (7th Cir. 1996).
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Table A
TPR: Statutes Requiring Conviction
STATE
Kansas

Nebraska

Nevada

New
Hampshire

New Mexico

STATUTE(S)
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 382271(a)(12) (Supp. 2019).
“Presumption of unfitness
when; burden of proof”

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 382269(e) (Supp. 2019).
“Factors to be considered in
termination of parental
rights; appointment of
permanent custodian”
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43292.02(4) (2019).
“Termination of parental
rights; state; duty to file;
when”
NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 128.105(1)(b)(8) (2018).
“Grounds for terminating
parental rights:
Considerations; required
findings”
NEV. REV. STAT. § 125C.210
(2018).
“Child conceived as a result
of sexual assault”
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170C:5-a (Supp. 2019).
“Ternination of the ParentChild Relationship in Cases
of Sexual Assault”

RELEVANT STATUTORY
LANGUAGE
Presumed that a parent is unfit
when the parent is convicted of
rape and the child was
conceived as a result of the
offense.
A finding of unfitness may be
found when a person is
convicted of a felony sexual
offense and the child was
conceived as a result of the
offense.
TPR shall be granted if a person
has been convicted, pled guilty
or nolo contendere to a sexual
assault and the child was
conceived as a result of the
offense.
A ground for TPR includes that
the natural parent was convicted
of a sexual assault and the child
was conceived as a result of the
offense.

Natural father has no rights to
custody or visitation if he is
convicted of sexual assault.

NOTES
The burden of proof is on the
parent to rebut presumption of
unfitness by a preponderance
of the evidence. KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-2271(b) (Supp.
2019).

TPR must be in best interest
of child.

TPR must be in best interest
of child.

Court may order custody or
visitation if the natural mother
consents and it is in the best
interest of the child.
Shall TPR when father has been TPR must be in best interest
of child.
convicted of or pled guilty or
nolo contendere to sexual
assault and the child was
Rebuttable presumption that
conceived as a result of the
TPR is in the best interest of
offense or “at a fact-finding
the child when there is a
hearing, is found beyond a
showing, beyond a reasonable
reasonable doubt to have
doubt, that the child’s birth
fathered the child through an act was a result of a sexual
assault of the mother.
of non-consensual sexual
penetration.”
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-16Biological parent may petition
TPR shall be granted if court
to TPR.
1(A) (2020).
“determines by clear and
convincing evidence that the
“Termination of parental
rights; conception resulting child was conceived as a result Presumption that TPR is in the
of a criminal sexual penetration best interest of the child.
from criminal sexual
for which the other biological
penetration”
parent was convicted.”
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STATUTE(S)

North Carolina N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B1111(a)(11) (2019).
“Grounds for terminating
parental rights”

RELEVANT STATUTORY
LANGUAGE
May TPR when the parent is
convicted of a sexually related
offense and the child was
conceived as a result of the
offense.

NOTES
Burden on the petitioner “to
prove facts justifying the
termination by clear and
convincing evidence.”
Court shall determine whether
termination is in best interest
of child. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B1110 (2019). (“Determination
of best interests of the
juvenile”).

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.21.24 (2019), “First-degree
forcible rape, Seconddegree forcible rape,
Statutory rape of a child by
an adult, First-degree
statutory rape.”
North Dakota

Oregon

N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-2044(1)(e) (2016).
“Termination of parental
rights”

May TPR if “[t]he parent has
pled guilty or nolo contendere to,
or has been found guilty of
engaging in a sexual act” and
the child was conceived as a
result of the offense.
OR. REV. STAT.
May TPR when the parent has
§ 419B.510(1) (2019).
been convicted of rape and the
“Termination upon finding child was conceived as a result
child conceived as result of the of rape.
rape”
OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137(6)
(2019).
“Factors considered in
determining custody of
child”

South Carolina S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-72570(11) (2010).
“Grounds.”

Tennessee

Person convicted of 1st or 2nd
degree forcible rape, statutory
rape of a child, or 1st degree
rape “has no rights to
custody . . . .”

TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1113(g)(10)(A) (2017 &
Supp. 2020).
“Termination of parental
rights”
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6102 (2017).
“Rape; child conceived;
custody or visitation rights;
rights of inheritance.”

TPR must be in the best
interest of the child.

TPR under this section is an
independent ground for TPR.

When determining custody, the
court “shall not award sole or
joint custody of child to a parent
if” the parent has been convicted
of rape and the child was
conceived as a result of the
rape.
TPR must be in the best
May TPR when the child was
conceived as a result of criminal interest of the child.
sexual conduct as “found by a
court of competent jurisdiction.” Statute references “sentencing
court” suggesting that a
conviction is required.
May TPR if the parent is
TPR must be in the best
convicted of aggravated rape,
interest of the child.
rape, or rape of a child and the
child was conceived as a result
of the rape.
Any person convicted of
aggravated rape, rape, or rape
of child shall not have custody or
visitation rights when the child
was conceived as a result of the
offense.

The other parent may request
that the court grant reasonable
visitation if paternity has been
acknowledged.
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STATUTE(S)

RELEVANT STATUTORY
NOTES
LANGUAGE
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2Facts must be established by
May TPR when the parent is
clear and convincing evidence.
309(a)(ix) (2019).
convicted of 1st or 2nd degree
st
nd
rd
“Grounds for termination of sexual assault or 1 , 2 , or 3
degree sexual abuse of minor
parent-child relationship;
and the child was conceived as
clear and convincing
a result of the offense.
evidence.”

Table B
TPR: States Requiring Clear and Convincing Evidence
STATE
Alaska

Colorado

Connecticut

STATUTE

RELEVANT STATUTORY
LANGUAGE

NOTES

ALASKA STAT.
§ 25.23.180(c)(2) (2018).
“Relinquishment and
termination of parent and
child relationships”

May TPR when the parent
committed an act of sexual
assault, sexual abuse of a minor,
or incest and the child was
conceived as a result of the
offense.

TPR must be in best interest
of child.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5105.7 (2020).
“Termination of parentchild legal relationship in
a case of an allegation
that a child was
conceived as a result of
sexual assault but in
which no conviction
occurred—legislative
declaration—definitions”

A victim may file to TPR when the Must show that TPR is in
“child was conceived as a result of best interest of child.
a sexual offense in which a
conviction did not occur.”

COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5105.5(3) (2020).
“Termination of parentchild legal relationship
upon a finding that the
child was conceived as a
result of sexual assault –
legislative declaration –
definitions”

A victim may file to terminate the
parent-child legal relationship
when the “child was conceived as
a result of an act that led to the
parent’s conviction for sexual
assault or for a conviction in which
the underlying factual basis was
sexual assault.”

Conviction must have
occurred on or after July 1,
2013.

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a112(j)(3)(G) (2019).
“Termination of parental
rights of child committed
to commissioner.”

Court may grant a petition to TPR
if it finds by clear and convincing
evidence that “the parent
committed an act that constitutes
sexual assault” and child was
conceived as a result of the
offense.

TPR must be in the best
interest of the child.
Statute applicable to any
child in the custody of the
Commissioner of Children
and Families.

Case law suggests that TPR
must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence. See
e.g. Casey K. v. State, 311
P.3d 637, 643 (Alaska
2013).

TPR must be in best interest
of child.
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STATUTE

RELEVANT STATUTORY
LANGUAGE

NOTES

FLA. STAT.
§ 39.806(1)(m) (2020).
“Grounds for termination
of parental rights.”

Grounds for TPR include “when
the court determines by clear and
convincing evidence that the child
was conceived as a result of an
act of sexual battery . . . .”

Presumed that TPR is in the
best interest of the child.

HAW. REV. STAT. § 57161(5) (2018).
“Termination of parental
rights; petition.”

May TPR when clear and
convincing evidence
demonstrates that the parent
committed a sexual assault and
the child was conceived as a
result of the sexual assault.

Presumed that TPR is in the
best interest of the child.

HAW. REV. STAT. § 57146(a)(17) (2018).
“Criteria and procedure in
awarding custody and
visitation; best interest of
the child.”

Natural parent shall not be
granted custody or visitation with
a child if the parent was convicted
of rape or sexual assault and the
child was conceived as a result of
that offense.

IDAHO CODE § 162005(2)(a) (2019).
“Conditions under which
termination may be
granted.”

Court may grant an order
terminating the relationship when
“[t]he parent caused the child to
be conceived as a result of rape,
incest, lewd conduct with a minor
child under the age of sixteen (16)
years, or sexual abuse of a child
under age sixteen (16) . . . .”

Indiana

IND. CODE § 31-35-3.57(a)(1) (2018).
“Court termination of
parent-child relationship;
findings.”

Shall TPR if court finds by clear TPR must be in the best
and convincing evidence that the interest of the child.
parent committed an act of rape
and the child was conceived as a
result of the rape.

Iowa

IOWA CODE
§§ 232.116(1)(p) (2014),
600A.8 (2020).
“Grounds for termination.”

May TPR if the court finds by
“clear and convincing evidence
that child was conceived as a
result of sexual abuse” and the
victim requests TPR.

Florida

Hawaii

Idaho

Petition to TPR may be filed
at any time.

Court may rebuttably
presume that TPR is in the
best interest of the child.
Case law states that grounds
for TPR must be shown by
clear and convincing
evidence. See, e.g., Idaho
Dep’t of Health & Welfare v.
Doe, 260 P.3d 1169, 1171
(Idaho 2011).

Best interest of child “shall
be the paramount
consideration.” IOWA CODE
§ 600A.1 (2020).
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STATUTE

RELEVANT STATUTORY
LANGUAGE

NOTES

LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art.
1004(I) (2014).
“Petition for termination of
parental rights;
authorization to file.”

Victim may file petition to TPR of
the perpetrator of the sex offense
when child was conceived as a
result of a sex offense defined in
R.S. 15:541.

“Termination shall result in
the loss of custody,
visitation, contact, and other
parental rights of the
perpetrator regarding the
child.”

LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art.
1015(3), 1015(9) (2014).
“Grounds; Termination of
parental rights.”

Ground for TPR includes
“conviction of a sex offense as
defined in R.S. 15:541 by the
natural parent which resulted in
the conception of the child.”

Sections 1015(3) and (9)
suggest that TPR is
permissible when there is
either a conviction of a
sexual offense or there is
clear and convincing
evidence.

LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art.
137 (2014).
“Denial of visitation;
felony rape; death of a
parent.”

When the child “was conceived
through the commission of a
felony rape, the parent who
committed the felony rape shall be
denied visitation rights and
contact with the child.”

Case law establishes that
TPR must be proved by
clear and convincing
evidence and must be in the
best interest of the child.
See, e.g., In re J.A., 752 So.
2d 806, 811 (La. 2000).

ME. STAT. tit. 22, § 4055 May TPR if court finds by clear
The court shall consider the
1-B (2019).
and convincing evidence that the best interest of the child.
“Grounds for termination.” child was conceived as a result of
sexual assault.
ME. STAT. tit. 19-A,
§ 1658 (West, Westlaw
through 2019 Second
Reg. Sess. of the 129th
Leg.).
“Termination of parental
rights and responsibilities
in cases involving sexual
assault.”

Court shall TPR when petitioner
proves by preponderance of
evidence that a parent was
convicted of a crime involving
sexual assault, and the child was
conceived as a result of the
sexual offense.

MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§ 5-1402(a) (LexisNexis
2019).
“Termination of parental
rights after conviction of
nonconsensual sexual
conduct that resulted in
conception of child.”

May TPR when the court finds
that the person “has been
convicted of an act of
nonconsensual sexual conduct” or
finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the person
committed an act of
nonconsensual sexual conduct
resulting in the conception of the
child.

Victim may file petition
Court is not required to TPR
if a parent is convicted of
gross sexual assault, the
other parent states that the
sexual act was consensual,
and the other parent
opposes the TPR.

Court may TPR when petitioner
proves by clear and convincing
evidence that child was conceived
as a result of a sexual assault.
Must find by clear and
convincing evidence that
TPR is in the best interest of
the child.
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STATUTE

RELEVANT STATUTORY
LANGUAGE

NOTES

Mississippi

MISS. CODE § 93-15119(1)(b) (2018).
“Grounds for involuntary
termination of parental
rights; standard
of proof; rebuttal of
allegations of desertion;
inquiry as to military
status.”

May TPR when the court finds by
clear and convincing evidence
that a parent committed a sexual
act and that the child was
conceived as a result of the
unlawful sexual act.

Court may exercise its
discretion not to TPR “if the
child’s safety and welfare will
not be compromised or
endangered and terminating
the parent’s parental right is
not in the child’s best
interests.” MISS. CODE. § 9315-123 (2017), “Court
discretion not to terminate.”

Missouri

MO. REV. STAT.
§ 211.447(11) (Supp.
2019).
“Juvenile officer
preliminary inquiry,
when—petition to
terminate parental rights
filed, when—juvenile
court may terminate
parental rights, when—
investigation to be
made—grounds for
termination.”

May TPR if “the court finds that by
clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence that the biological father
committed the act of forcible rape
or rape in first degree against the
biological mother” and the child
was conceived as a result of the
act.

Victim of rape may file
petition to TPR of the
biological father.

MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 413-609, -801(2) (2019).
“Termination of parental
rights where a child was
conceived without
consent;” “Criteria for
termination.”

Victim may file.
May TPR when the parent “is
convicted of a felony in which
sexual intercourse occurred” or “at
a fact-finding hearing is found by
clear and convincing
evidence . . . to have committed
an act of sexual intercourse
without consent, sexual assault, or
incest that caused the child to be
conceived.”

MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5503(8) (2019).
“Sexual intercourse
without consent.”

Provision contained within
Person convicted of 45-5-503
Criminal Code.
(“Sexual intercourse without
consent”) forfeits all parental and
custodial rights to the child.
Provisions of Penalty
Enhancement (Section 41-1401) must be followed for
section to apply.

OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 14-904(B)(11) (2011).
“Termination of parental
rights in certain
situations.”

May TPR upon “a finding that the
child was conceived as a result of
rape perpetrated by the parent
whose rights are sought to be
terminated.”

Montana

Oklahoma

Court must find by
preponderance of evidence
that TPR is in the best
interest of child.

Court shall not TPR unless it
is in the best interest of the
child.
Case law suggests that TPR
must be established by clear
and convincing evidence.
See, e.g., In re E.H., 429
P.3d 1003, 1007 (Okla. Civ.
App. 2018).
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23 PA. CONS. STAT.
May TPR if “the parent is the
§ 2511(a)(7) (2010).
father of a child conceived as a
“Grounds for involuntary result of rape or incest.”
termination.”

[Vol. 27:311
NOTES

TPR must be in the best
interest of the child.
Pursuant to case law
grounds for TPR must be
established by clear and
convincing evidence. See,
e.g., In re Y.A., No. 1059
EDA 2018, 2018 WL
4270291, at *3-4 (Pa. Super.
Ct. Sept. 7, 2018).
Provision contained in
Adoption Act Victim need not
have a contemplated
adoption. H.B. 1984, 201920 Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Pa. 2019). Prior to
H.B. 1984 passing, the PA
Superior Court held that
victim need not have a
contemplated adoption if for
cause shown. See In re Z.E.,
Nos. 3577 EDA 2018 & 3624
EDA 2018, 2019 WL
3779711 (Pa. Super. Ct.
Aug. 12, 2019).

23 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 5329(b.1) (2018).
“Consideration of criminal
conviction.”

If the parent who is the victim
objects, the court shall not award
any type of custody to a parent
convicted of a sexual offense
when the child was conceived as
a result of the sexual offense.

Texas

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 161.007(a) (West
2014).
“Termination When
Pregnancy Results From
Criminal Act.”

The court shall TPR if the court
TPR must be in the best
interest of the child.
finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent
committed sexual assault and the
child was conceived as a result of
the offense.

Wisconsin

WIS. STAT. § 48.415(9)
(2018).
“Grounds for involuntary
termination of parental
rights.”

Ground for TPR includes
“[p]arenthood as a result of sexual
assault . . . Conception as a result
of sexual assault as specified in
this paragraph may be proved by
a final judgement of conviction or
other evidence produced at a factfinding hearing.”

A court may award any type
of custody if the victim has
opportunity to be heard; child
consents; and court finds it is
in the best interest of the
child.

Burden of proof is not
specified for “other evidence
produced at a fact- finding
hearing.” Case law suggests
it would be a clear and
convincing standard. See,
e.g., In re Kyle S.-G, 533
N.W.2d 794, 799 (Wis.
1995).
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Table C
State Statutes: Custody/Visitation
STATE

STATUTE

RELEVANT STATUTORY
LANGUAGE

NOTES

Arizona

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-416 (2017). “Sexual
assault conviction; effects
on rights.”

Person convicted of sexual
assault does not have legal
decision-making or parentingtime rights with regard to the
child if the child was conceived
as a result of the assault.

Arkansas

ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10121 (2015).
“Termination of certain
parental rights for
putative fathers convicted
of rape.”

“All rights of a putative father to The biological mother may
custody, visitation, or contact
petition the court to reinstate
with a child conceived as a
the parental rights.
result of a rape shall be
terminated immediately upon
conviction of the rape in which
the child was conceived . . .”

California

CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 3030(b) (West 2020).
“Sex offenders;
murderers; custody and
visitation; child
support; disclosure of
information relating to
custodial parent.”

“No person shall be granted
custody of, or visitation with, a
child if the person has been
convicted under Section 261 of
the Penal code (rape) and the
child was conceived as a result
of that violation.”

Delaware

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 724A(e) (2009).
“Rebuttable presumption
against unsupervised
visitation, custody or
residence of a child to a
sex offender.”

When the biological father of a
child is convicted, pleads guilty
or nolo contendere to any
degree of rape or unlawful
sexual intercourse in the 1st or
2nd degree and the child was
conceived as a result of the
offense, he “shall not be
permitted visitation privileges.”

Illinois

750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 46
/622 (2018).
“Allocation of parental
responsibilities or
parenting time prohibited
to men who father
through sexual assault or
sexual abuse.”

A father, who was convicted,
pled guilty or nolo contendere to
a sexual offense or,
at a fact-finding hearing, “is
found by clear and convincing
evidence to have committed an
act of non-consensual sexual
penetration” and the child was
conceived as a result of the
offense, is “not entitled to”
parenting time with the child
without the mother’s consent.

Kentucky

KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 403.322, 405.028
(West 2018).
“Custody, visitation, and
inheritance rights denied
parent convicted of felony
sexual offense from
which victim delivered a
child; waiver; child
support obligation.”

“[A]ny person who has been
convicted of a felony offense
under KRS Chapter 510, in
which the victim of that offense
has conceived and delivered a
child, shall not have custody or
visitation rights . . . . “

Petition may be filed by the
mother or the child’s
guardian as an affirmative
petition or an affirmative
defense.

michigan journal of gender

398
STATE

& law

[Vol. 27:311

STATUTE
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NOTES

Massachusetts

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
209C, § 3 (2018).
“Paternity and support
actions; jurisdiction;
enforcement of prior
orders or judgments;
juvenile court
commitment proceedings;
parents convicted of first
degree murder.”

The court shall not award
visitation rights to a parent who
is convicted of rape, and the
child was conceived as a result
of the offense, “unless the judge
determines that such child is of
suitable age to signify the child’s
assent and the child assents to
such order and that assent is in
the best interest of the child.”

The court may award
visitation to a parent
convicted of rape under
MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 265,
§ 23 (2018), if visitation is in
the best interest of the child
and the other parent of the
child has turned 18 and
consents to visitation or the
judge determines that
visitation is in the best
interest of the child.

New Jersey

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4.1
(West 2013).
“Custody and visitation
denied to person
fathering a
child through rape;
obligation to support
minor child unaffected.”

“A person convicted of sexual
assault under N.J.S. 2C:14-2
shall not be awarded custody or
visitation rights to any minor
child, including a minor child
who was born as a result of or
was the victim of the sexual
assault, except upon a showing
by clear and convincing
evidence that it is in the best
interest of the child for custody
or visitation rights to be
awarded.”

A denial of custody or
visitation shall not by itself
TPR of the person denied
visitation or custody.

New York

N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 240 (McKinney 2010).
“Custody and child
support; orders of
protection.”

“[R]ebuttable presumption that it
is not in the best interest of the
child to be placed in the custody
of or to visit with a person who
has been convicted of” rape and
child was conceived as a result
of the offense.

The court may order
visitation or custody if the
child is of suitable age and
consents to an order or, if
the child is not of suitable
age, the child’s parent of
custodian consents to an
order.

Ohio

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3109.504 (LexisNexis
2015).
“Prohibition against order
granting parental rights to
offender; termination of
order upon notice.”

The court shall not “issue an
order granting parental rights to
a person who has been
convicted of or plead guilty to
rape or sexual battery and has
been declared . . . to be the
parent of the child conceived as
a result of rape or sexual battery
committed by the person.”

If the court issued an order
granting parental rights, the
court shall terminate the
order upon receipt of a
notice under OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3109.503
(LexisNexis 2015).

Rhode Island

15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-516(d)(4) (2003).
“Alimony and counsel
fees—Custody of
children.”

“No person shall be granted
custody of or visitation with a
child if that person has been
convicted” or pled nolo
contendere to a sexual assault
and child was conceived as a
result of the that act.

Court may order supervised
visitation and counseling if
the biological mother
consents and the court
determines that visitation is
in the best interest of the
child.

An order awarding custody
or visitation must be stayed
for 10 days to allow appeal.
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South Dakota

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 254A-20 (2013).
“Presumption that
granting custody or
visitation rights to person
causing conception by
rape or incest not in best
interest of child.”

Rebuttable presumption that “it
is not in the best interest of the
child” to have visitation with a
person that the court has found
by clear and convincing
evidence to have committed an
act of rape or incest that
resulted in the conception of the
child.

The court may revoke
visitation rights if it finds by
clear and convincing
evidence that the person
committed an act of rape or
incest that resulted in the
conception of the child.

Utah

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5414 (LexisNexis 2017).
“Child conceived as result
of a sexual offense—
Custody and parenttime.”

A person convicted of a sexual
offense that results in
conception of a child may not be
granted custody or parent-time
rights.

The court may award
custody or parenting time if
the non-offending parent
consents and the court finds
it is in the best interest of the
child.

Virginia

VA. CODE ANN. § 20124.1 (2019).
“Definitions.”

A person with a legitimate
interest (in a custody
proceeding) does not include a
person convicted of rape when
the child was conceived as a
result of the rape.

West Virginia

W. VA. CODE § 48-9-209a
(2015).
“Child conceived as result
of sexual assault or
sexual abuse by a parent;
rights of a biological
parent convicted of
sexual assault or abuse;
post-conviction
cohabitation; rebuttable
presumption upon
separation or divorce.”

The court shall not allocate
custodial rights or time with the
child to the biological parent
convicted of sexual assault
when the child was conceived
as a result of the rape.

Court may order custodial
rights or time with the child if
it finds by “clear and
convincing evidence that it is
in the best interest of the
child, adequately protects
the child and the victim,” and
that the person(s) with
custody consent.
A denial of custodial
responsibility or parenting
time does not by itself TPR.

Table D:
Parentage
STATE
Georgia

STATUTE
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-722(d)(2) (2018).
“Petition to legitimatize
child.”

RELEVANT STATUTORY
LANGUAGE
There is a presumption against
legitimation when the court
“determines by clear or
convincing evidence that the
father caused his child to be
conceived as a result of having
nonconsensual intercourse with
the mother of his child.”

NOTES
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Michigan

& law

STATUTE

RELEVANT STATUTORY
LANGUAGE

MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 722.1445(2) (2019).
“Determinations and
orders; powers and duties
of court.”

When the mother “proves by
clear and convincing evidence
that the child was conceived as
result of nonconsensual sexual
penetration the court shall do
one of the following:
(a) Revoke an
acknowledgement of parentage
for an acknowledged father.
(b) Determine that the genetic
father is not the child’s father.
(c) Set aside an order of filiation
for an affiliated father.
(d) Make a determination of
paternity regarding an alleged
father and enter an order of
revocation of paternity of that
alleged father.”

MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 722.25 (2019).
“Child custody disputes;
controlling interests,
presumption; award of
custody to parent
convicted of criminal
sexual conduct or acts of
nonconsensual sexual
penetration”

The court shall not award
custody when a parent is
convicted of criminal sexual
conduct or if found by clear and
convincing evidence in a factfinding hearing to have
committed acts of
nonconsensual sexual
penetration and the child is
conceived as a result of the
acts.

[Vol. 27:311
NOTES

2020]
STATE
Vermont

401

THE STABILITY PARADOX

STATUTE
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C,
§ 616 (2019).
“Precluding establishment
of parentage by
perpetrator of sexual
assault.”

RELEVANT STATUTORY
LANGUAGE

NOTES

Section does not apply if the
“In a proceeding in which a
person has already been
person is alleged to have
committed a sexual assault that adjudicated to be the parent of
resulted in the birth of a child, the child.
the person giving birth may seek
to preclude the establishment of Must show by clear and
the other person’s parentage.” convincing evidence that the
person was convicted of a
sexual assault and the child
was conceived as a result of
the conduct or clear and
convincing evidence that the
person committed the sexual
assault and the child was
conceived as a result of the
sexual assault.
If court finds that the burden
has been met, it “shall enter
an order (1) adjudicating that
the person alleged to have
committed a sexual assault is
not the parent of the child; 2)
requiring that the Department
of Health amend the birth
certificate to delete the name
of the person precluded as a
parent; and 3) requiring that
the person alleged to have
committed a sexual offense to
pay child support or birthrelated costs, or both, unless
the person giving birth
requests otherwise.”

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 665(f)(1)-(2) (2019).
“Rights and
responsibilities order; best
interests of the child.”

“The court may enter an order
awarding sole parental rights
and responsibilities to parent
and denying all parent-child
contact with the other parent if
the court finds . . . that the
nonmoving parent was
convicted of sexually assaulting
the moving parent and the child
was conceived as a result of the
sexual assault” or the court
“finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the child was
conceived as a result of the
nonmoving parent sexually
assaulting or sexually exploiting
the moving parent.”

The court may also award
sole parental rights to the
moving party when the moving
party was trafficked by the
nonmoving party.
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Washington

STATUTE
WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.26A.465 (2020).
“Precluding establishment
of parentage by
perpetrator of sexual
assault.”

& law

RELEVANT STATUTORY
LANGUAGE
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Parent may seek to preclude the Section does not apply if the
person who committed a sexual person who committed the
sexual assault “has previously
assault that resulted in
conception of the child from
been adjudicated in a
establishing or maintaining
proceeding . . . to be a parent
parentage of the child.
of the child.”
If the court determines
An allegation that child was
conceived as a result of sexual allegations have been proved
assault may be proved by a
“the court shall: (a) Adjudicate
conviction or guilty plea or by
that the person . . . is not the
clear, cogent, and convincing parent of the child . . .
evidence that the person
(b) Require the state registrar
committed the sexual assault. of vital statistics to amend the
birth record if requested by the
parent and the court
determines that the
amendment is in the best
interest of the child . . . .”

More detailed versions of Tables A-D may be found at
jclewisesq.wordpress.com. Click the Resources Tab then select “The
Stability Paradox.”

